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CRESG Canterbury Regional Energy Strategy Group / Canterbury Regional
Energy Forum
CRESG Members Canterbury Employers’ Chamber of Commerce, Environment Canter-
bury, Meridian Energy, Orion Networks and Transpower, and invited
representatives from the Canterbury District Health Board and the
Christchurch City Council
Common Language A summary and comparison of key specification, planning and
performance criteria used in the electricity sector. Intended ulti-
mately to form a standardised and harmonised set of criteria to
facilitate regional collaboration and cooperation in energy planning
and investment
EC Electricity Commission
Regional Energy Compendium An overview of both grid and non-grid connected energy infrastruc-
ture, assets and resources within the Canterbury Region
EEA Guidelines Power Industry Guidelines developed by the Electricity Engineers
Association of New Zealand
N Security Is a network architecture without any redundancy. An outage to
customers will occur in the event of a single failure or failure (N) in
the network.
N-1 Security Is a network architecture that includes redundancy for a single fault
or failure event
N-2 Security Is a network architecture that includes redundancy for two separate
fault or failure events
N-g-1 Is a network architecture that includes redundancy for a single
separate fault or failure event, including generation failure
Interrupted n-1 Security Is similar to ‘N-1 Security’ but following a single fault the power
supply is interrupted for a short period of time whilst switching of
the network takes place.  The advantage of this type of security over
the ‘N security’ case is that power can be restored in switching time
as opposed to fault repair time.  For an 11kV cable network, this is
typically a 6-8 hour time saving for each fault.
Interrupted n-2 Security Is similar to ‘N-2 Security’ but following a double fault the power
supply is interrupted for a short period of time whilst switching of
the network takes place.  The advantage of this type of security over
the ‘N Security’ and ‘N-1 Security’ cases is that power can be
restored in switching time as opposed to fault repair time.  For a
66kV cable fault, this is typically a 5 day time saving.
Grid Upgrade Plan (GUP) The grid upgrade plan is a plan for grid expansions, replacements
and upgrades, produced by Transpower at the request of the
Electricity Commission
Grid Investment Test (GIT) Is an economic test undertaken when comparing the costs and
benefits of different network solutions. Its general form is prescribed
by the EC.
Grid Reliability Standard (GRS) Is used to provide a basis, in conjunction with the Grid Investment
Test (GIT), for planning and development of the national transmis-
sion grid.
Optimised Deprival Valuation (ODV) Is the regulated value of a network and provides a value basis for
calculating prices within that network
Glossary
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Outage An ‘outage’ to customer connections is considered to have occurred
if supply is disconnected for any duration.  That is, any noticeable
loss of power to a customer connection constitutes an ‘outage’.
This differs from the regulatory definition where the power must be
off for more than one minute to constitute an ‘outage’.  This change
in definition allows the true cost of short outages to customers to
be captured in the analysis.
Probabilistic Standard Probabilistic standards are based on the probability of failure of
specific assets against the value of lost load to customers at that
location. However, they do not deliver a known outcome for a
particular event.
Deterministic Standard Deterministic standards are based on the average level of security
required for typical geographical locations, load group sizes and
customer types.  For a given fault, a deterministic standard always
delivers a known outcome.
Switching Time The time it takes power to be restored via network open point
changes in the event of a fault.
Total Cost of Outage (TCOO) The total annual cost of outages to customers when implementing
specific network architectures.
Value of Lost Load (VoLL) This is the average value that an average consumer places on un-
served load or unsupplied energy.
Value of Interruption (VOI) This is the value that an average consumer places on an interruption
to supply.  Unlike VOLL, VOI is the consumer cost of experiencing
the first minute of an outage.
Value of Customer Reliability (VCR) This is term used by VENCORP (Victoria authority in Australia) to
describe the equivalent of VOLL + VOI in this report.
Security of Supply The inherent ability of a network to meet the customer demand for
energy delivery without interruption.Is a function of system configu-
ration and its inherent ability to continue operation under contin-
gencies.
Reliability of Supply (also known as Adequacy) The actual performance of the network in
terms of the amount of interruption actually experienced by the
customer [EEA definition]
SAIDI “System Average Interruption Duration Index” - measures the
average number of minutes per annum that a consumer is without
electricity.
SAIFI “System Average Interruption Frequency Index” - measures the
average number of times per annum that a consumer is without
electricity.
Constraint A local limitation in the transmission capacity of the grid required to
maintain grid security or power quality.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Energy is both a national and a regional issue,
and ensuring a secure and reliable energy
supply is an inherent component of meeting
the energy needs of future generations.
Yet, when one looks at the New Zealand energy
system and reflects upon the apparent policy
failure that have characterise national action
over the last two decades on energy security
and future supply, then one can not but
conclude that a different approach is required.
Further reflection will identify that the energy
system, itself is characterised by the
interdependencies that govern supply and
demand, and the co-dependencies that
determine system resilience and reliability.
Together these dependencies and complexities
form the settings within which the risk and
vulnerabilities inherent in the supply and
delivery of energy services manifest them-
selves. It is a complex system, made more
complex by consumer expectations of a reliable
and affordable supply.
A competitive energy supply is a prerequisite
to continued economic growth and improve-
ments to social well-being. Assurance of supply
is therefore about managing our energy
vulnerabilities and making informed decisions
for the future. It is ultimately about sharing in
the responsibility for creating the balance
between multiple and at times competing
goals. Failure of the industry to rise to this
challenge has instead lead to the current
situation where consumers are expressing their
strong dissatisfaction with existing regimes and
are asking how, as a country, we can do better
in meeting future energy needs?
This project is intended to pick up that
challenge. It has set out to take a different
look at the energy equation and by so doing,
to achieve for the people of Canterbury a
secure supply of reliable and affordable energy.
In particular, the Canterbury Regional Energy
Strategy Project is intended to improve energy
delivery to the region through:
• an assessment of Supply Reliability;
• an assessment of System Resilience;
• offering a framework for regional collabora-
tion; and
• identifying and addressing infrastructure
assurance priorities.
In essence the project is about providing
improved choices, the ability to make informed
decisions and sharing in the responsibility for
risk mitigation with regards the total energy
system and security of supply.
The Study aims to articulate the critical issue
facing the region, and to explore the trade-offs
that will be required to reach a balanced
perspective on the current situation. It is
hoped that by so doing, there will be commu-
nity agreement as to the broad-based priorities
for improving the resilience of the system, as
well as action to catalyse investment in the
underpinning infrastructure required by the
region.
Key Findings
1. The Canterbury region is very heavily reliant
on Transmission to supply energy to the
region as it has limited regional generation
and is ‘selectively endowed’ with other
non-electric energy resources.
2. The study team noted that the various
stakeholders did not consistently apply the
projections of future demand. This leaves
open the question of how best to get
agreement on future demand projections?
3. Notable also is the fact that almost all
future forecast generation growth is
dominated by non-firm renewable energy,
an indication that the existing reliance on
grid supply is likely to remain and that the
timing of future grid upgrade decisions will
be critical to addressing future supply risk.
We ask, instead, how the options for
security of supply and regional growth
requirements are factored into preferred
investment plans?
4. Currently, it appears that the grid in the
upper half of the South Island only has n-1
security because of operational constraints.
This raises the question as to whether the grid
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planning criteria is too narrow and doesn’t
accommodate the effects of proposed
upgrades on a wider regional/market area.
5. At the sub-transmission or distribution
level, maintaining n-1 security may not be
the best solution for all market participants
as the cost involved in maintaining this
security level could potentially outweigh
the economic value of the un-served load.
This forms the basis of the ongoing
discussion regarding core vs non-core grid,
and rural vs. urban security of supply
requirements.
6. Distributed generation is unlikely to be a
satisfactory response both at transmission
and sub-transmission levels for maintaining
n-1 security levels under all operational
conditions.
7. Potentially, local / distributed generation
exposes the Upper South Island, increasing
nodal risk and retailer exposures by
deferring upgrades to the transmission grid.
The question remains as to whether there
are more appropriate strategies to manage
the risks to the network arising from large
interregional flows.
8. Different investment plans result in different
distributions of the benefits of the invest-
ment. There may be a case for exploring
the “weakest link” in relation to regional
security standards. We therefore ask how
does one establish an appropriate trade-off
between regional benefits versus a national
perspective in terms of a regions net
contribution to the entire system?
9. Associated with the n-1 security of the grid
is the load profile of the Canterbury region.
Large amounts of peak shifting occur to
flatten out the demand over normal
peaking times. The question thus arises as
to what extent should the grid rely on peak
shifting in order to provide n-1 security?
10. Our understanding of the age distribution
of current assets and the lack of power
factor correction with the networks sug-
gests an inefficient sub transmission sector
characterise by high standing losses.
However, we accept that this is a proposi-
tion that remains to be tested and we
intend to do so in Stage 2.
11. We suggest that the Grid Investment Test
(GIT) does not satisfactorily account for a
number of important issues, in particular
the interdependency of transmission and
generation and that the National Grid
should be considered a “system of sys-
tems”.
12. We argue that the inability of the GIT to
take this into account can conceivably
result in sub-optimal investments being
made, which may be at odds with other
policy initiatives such as the Climate
Change Strategy or National Energy Policy.
The extent of this misalignment is some-
thing we intend to assess in Stage 2.
13. The objective function of economic effi-
ciency desired by the GIT does not ad-
equately provide for regional economic
development priorities and community
needs.
Creating an appropriate channel that will allow
regional priorities and community desires
to become an input into the national
decision making framework is a fundamen-
tal premise of this study.
14. The economic efficiency that drives the
incremental investment process results in
economies of scale being lost.  Anecdotal
evidence suggest that investment signals
are not present in the market early enough
to be able to justify large scale investment.
We intend to investigate this further in
Stage 2.
15. The decreasing affordability of energy as a
result of the factors above is evident in the
increasing proportion of the community
becoming “energy poor”, defined as the
situation where energy costs exceed 10% of
a person’s wage.
16. Reserve margins in the system are getting
smaller due to the delays in generation
investment. This loss may be further
compounded by unanticipated events
outside the control of the GIT process, e.g.
delays in the RMA consent process.
17. This shrinking of the margin affects the
ability of the system to cope with unfore-
seen events. A reliable system come about
form the combination of security and
adequacy. It would seem that what is
considered adequate for Canterbury
remains open to debate. This is an area for
further investigation as part of Stage 2.
The Study Team acknowledges the need to
work within the existing industry and regula-
tory processes but is instead asking whether it
is possible to introduce a new planning
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paradigm that will facilitate the prioritisation of
regional and community requirements in the
national decision making framework.
This paradigm will be a combination of a
Regional Statement of Opportunities, sup-
ported by a Common Language and Collabora-
tion Protocol that is aligned with both ECan’s
Regional Energy Strategy and the proposed
National Energy Policy.
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1  INTRODUCTION
The Canterbury region is one of the fastest
growing regions in the country. To propel this
development, energy from various sources and
types is utilised to power industry and agricul-
ture, and support business, development and
lifestyle. Energy survey information illustrates
the overall trend of increasing (as the trend is
nationally), rather than stabilising or decreas-
ing energy use, and our dependence on oil
products. Our ever-increasing dependence on
energy for both ‘stationary’ and ‘mobility’
purposes coincides at a time when the region
[2] faces significant future uncertainty in the
area of availability and prices of some energy
sources.
Energy has become both a national and a local
issue due to factors such as electricity industry
reforms of the last decade, a growing commu-
nity reliance on high quality energy services
and, increasingly, climate change and other
environmental issues. This shift in focus is
supported by the growing policy emphasis
towards sustainable development and associ-
ated actions; of which a vital component is
addressing energy security and supply and
demand issues within the framework of
creating for the country and its regions, a
sustainable energy system.
Increasingly, as evidenced by the Canterbury
regional energy seminars held in late 2005,
individuals and communities are looking for
solutions and to influence policy so as to
mandate better outcomes, as they perceive the
issues. These issues will need to be dealt with
in the context of the Canterbury energy system
- which has unique attributes in terms of:
energy use patterns, location issues, user
issues (e.g. service standards) and network
issues.
The ‘cross-roads’ issues we face are now being
reflected in regional communities asking for
regional solutions and a seeking an appropri-
ate balance between developing or maintaining
macro energy infrastructure versus provision of
smaller distributed and ‘micro’ solutions. There
is now more evidence available both nationally
(CAE, 2003 [3]) and internationally (e.g.
Hoffman and High-Pippert, 2005 4]; DTI, 2006
[5]) to suggest that ‘community energy’, based
on a mix of distributed technologies offers a
serious alternative or supplement to our
centralised power system.
Notwithstanding the impact of the NZ Energy
Strategy, a number of key programmes and
legislation attempt to deal with enabling an
effective and sustainable energy system
including: the NEECS; the RMA; and (indirectly)
the LGA [6].
The RMA has greatest significance currently to
councils. The 2004 RMA amendments require a
taking into account the ‘benefits to be derived
from the use and development from renewable
energy’. The region’s Regional Policy Statement
(RPS) is the key means by which the purpose
of the RMA can be achieved with a regional
energy strategy (RES) [7] being a core method
to achieve those RPS requirements.
Further amendments to the RMA in 2005 now
require regional and district councils to give
effect to the RPS and for regional and district
councils to agree upon the consultation
process for a review (process is now
underway). The relationship between regional
and territorial authorities in relation to energy
issues has been of little importance until now
but this is set to change. The territorial
councils are now able to play a stronger role
by ensuring that district plans reflect the
renewable energy objectives of the RPS (such
as making provision for various scale energy
generation facilities); and considerable scope
exists for flexibility for applying more liberal
consent terms (thresholds and duration) when
applied to renewable resources.
Energy considerations (in the form of appropri-
ate space heating technology) are also a
feature of ECan’s Clean Air Policy (CAP). The
National Environmental Standards for Air
Quality (NES) require improvement in air
quality between now and 2013 to avoid impact
on the region’s economy (driven in large part
by growing demand for electricity services).
ECan’s Proposed Air Plan [52] and Clean Heat
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Project (CHP) are the key means of meeting the
NES. ECan’s CHP is designed to replace the use
of old style (pre-1992) fuel burners and open
fires; and substitute their use with ‘clean’ (air
emission) alternatives [53].
This Report is intended to present a high level
overview of the Grid-Connected infrastructure
in the Canterbury region as seen from various
perspectives – i.e. stakeholder, security of
supply, affordability etc. In doing so, the Study
Team has attempted to identify commonalities
as well as misalignments in specification,
delivery and performance criteria, which
arguably are contributing to increasing
vulnerabilities in the supply of energy to the
region.
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2  STUDY OUTLINE
The Canterbury Regional Energy Strategy
Project (CRESP), sponsored by the Canterbury
Regional Energy Forum, is aimed at securing
the future of energy supply in the Canterbury
Region through the development of a new
paradigm that will facilitate cooperation among
regional stakeholders, provide regional input
into regulatory decision making processes, and
secure industry agreement and collaboration to
achieve a desired set of outcomes and options
that would ensure the security of energy
supply to the Canterbury region for the future.
Central to the development of such a paradigm
would be effective communication mechanisms
between regional stakeholders, so that
information related to risks and vulnerabilities
of the regional energy system can be communi-
cated to all stakeholders in such a way that
they can easily understand what is important
and can use the information to make informed
decisions, in the face of conflicting and
competing public goals, corporate objectives
and multiple responsibilities.
Ultimately, this project is intended to contrib-
ute towards an integrated Regional Statement
of Opportunities that will:
• Articulate the critical energy issues for the
Canterbury Region;
• Characterise the risks and vulnerabilities
inherent in energy supply to the region
• Critically investigate all viable options to
achieve the desired energy balance;
• Align the investment plans and decision
making frameworks of the regional
stakeholders; and,
• Achieve regional agreement on the effects
of trade-offs to reach a balanced perspec-
tive that takes account of security, risk,
economic opportunity and consumer
preferences.
This will provide broad based priorities for
improving resilience and investment in the
underpinning energy infrastructure to the
betterment of all in the region.
Approach
In order to ensure a robust framework for
analysis, the Regional Statement of Opportuni-
ties will be based upon a sound foundation of
data gathering, consultation, expert knowledge
and decision support tools which will allow the
prioritising of future effort and benchmark
comparisons with the other regions. This
project is intended to be a leading project that
will become a model for other regions to
follow.
In order to provide this sound foundation it is
proposed that the project is separated into
three Stages.
• Stage 1 will be concerned with the develop-
ment of a consistent framework and
methodology, both for the project itself,
and for ongoing future regional policy
development.
• Stage 2 will be focused on the develop-
ment of an effective language to describe
infrastructure resilience in terms that are
widely understood by stakeholders and
convey meaningful information to all
industry participants.
• Stage 3 will focus on the community
consolation and communication plans that
are essential for realising potential opportu-
nities whilst managing community expecta-
tions for an affordable and reliable energy
supply.
Specifically, the scope for Stage 1 was to:
• To characterise the energy system in the
Canterbury region, in particular, reviewing
system characteristics, vulnerabilities,
potential investment opportunities and
other relevant issues;
• To investigate the broad parameters and
protocols for a framework that would allow
major regional stakeholders to collabora-
tively address critical issues to ensure the
future security of energy supply in the
region;
• To review, align and standardise key
concepts, definitions and terminology used
by key regional stakeholder to ensure more
effective communication and collaboration.
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Expected Outcomes
The project is intended ultimately to provide a
road map for determining future energy
options for Canterbury, and a framework for
regulatory decision-making. This road map will
identify the critical energy assets for the
region, its resources and future utilisation
options, and characterise the risks and
vulnerabilities of future choices for the region.
Deliverables
The deliverables for this work stream, WS01,
were as follows:
a. A ‘Snapshot’ of the Grid Connected compo-
nent of the Canterbury Energy System
(resources, assets, vulnerabilities, etc)
b. A Template for a Regional Collaboration
Framework that will allow major regional
stakeholders to engage with each other to
address energy issues in Canterbury;
c. A Common Language Vocabulary or Lexicon
to support the Collaboration Framework
And also contribute towards:
d. A Template for an Updateable Regional
Energy Compendium, that will contribute
towards Environment Canterbury’s Regional
Energy Plan and Regional Energy Policy
e. A Programme of Action for Stage 2, that is
expected to contribute towards the devel-
opment of a Regional Energy Road Map
and Regional Energy Investment Plan in
Stage 3.
The principle driving this process is recognising
that no one solution is correct and that
community awareness and participation will
lead to improved choices.
About CAENZ
CAENZ is an independent-think tank and
research facilitator funded by grants and
sponsorships, based at the University of
Canterbury Campus, Christchurch. CAENZ’s
mission is to advance social progress and
economic growth for New Zealand through
broadening national understanding of emerging
technologies and facilitating early adoption of
advanced technology solutions.
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3  REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Economic Profile
The Canterbury economy accounted for 14.6%
of total economic activity in New Zealand in
the year to March 2004.
Its regional GDP in the same year totalled
$19.9 billion, with a per capita nominal GDP of
$35,650 in the year to March 2003, compared
to a national figure of $32,100. Canterbury’s
per capita real GDP grew at an average of 3.7%
between March 1998 and 2003, well above the
New Zealand growth rate of 2.3%.
Canterbury’s unemployment rate averaged 4.1%
over the year to June 2004, compared to a
national rate of 4.3%. The region’s labour force
participation rate is the highest in New
Zealand, suggesting that the vast majority of
able and willing workers are actively employed.
This is reflected in the relatively high GDP per
capita in the region. It also indicates that any
additional economic growth will have to stem
from population growth or labour and capital
productivity gains.
Labour productivity (real GDP per employee) in
Canterbury grew at an average of 0.8%
between 2000 and 2004. Nationwide, labour
productivity growth averaged 0.9% per year
over this period.
Canterbury spends an above-average amount
on economic development relative to its GDP
($1,300 per $million of GDP), compared to New
Zealand as a whole ($1,100 per $million of
GDP). Despite this expenditure, the region’s
enterprise creation and destruction rates are
not vastly different to the national averages.
Economic Growth
Canterbury’s economic growth between March
2000 and 2004 averaged 4.8%, compared to a
national average of 3.5% for the same period,
making Canterbury the second fastest growing
region of those covered by NZIER’s regional
economic dataset.
The steady growth in the Canterbury economy
of the past few years is, however, expected to
slow in the near term. Current forecasts
indicate that the South Island economy is
cooling, with the annual rate of economic
growth forecast to fall from 3.8% to 3.2%.
Although this cooling trend is expected to
continue for a few years, economic growth is
still predicted, but at a slower rate than the
past few years. In the Canterbury region, there
has most recently been a decline in economic
growth, with growth of 2.2% (quarter for
quarter) in quarter 1 of this year, giving way to
a 0.4% drop in quarter 2. This has been
primarily attributed to the Canterbury econo-
my’s exposure to manufacturing and tourism,
which are particularly vulnerable to recent high
exchange rates and increased oil costs.
Population Growth
The 1996 and 2001 Census data suggests a
projected Canterbury population of 558,600 in
2016 and 584,400 by 2026 from an estimated
base population of 526,300 in 2005 [Regional
Gravel Management Report 2006]. The follow-
ing table provides the projected population
growth rates for the Canterbury region.
 Change 
Period Number Percentage 
Increase 
Ave. Annual 
Rate of Change 
1996-2005 45,900 9.5% 1.0% 
2005-2016 32,300 6.0% 0.6% 
2016-2026 25,800 4.6% 0.5% 
Table 1: Projected Canterbury Population
Change 1996-2006 [Regional Gravel Manage-
ment Report 2006; p34]
Population growth generally goes hand in hand
with economic growth, and concentrations of
population generate on-going demand for
electricity and the requisite investment in
transmission and distribution infrastructure.
When population growth is considered on a
more magnified scale, such as on a district-by-
district basis, it can provide an indication of
the areas where growth, and therefore infra-
structure investment, is most likely to occur.
The following map represents the Canterbury
Region using colour coding to show a percent-
age change in the population across the
region. The data used for the map was sourced
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from Statistics New Zealand, and estimates
population change for each district out until
2016.
Fig 1: Canterbury District Population Projec-
tions to 2016 [Regional Gravel Management
Report 2006; p40]
This map indicates that population growth for
the South Canterbury districts of Waitaki and
Waimate is expected to decrease by more than
5% over the period to 2016. Population in the
Mackenzie, Timaru and Ashburton Districts are
predicted to stagnate, while Banks Peninsula,
Christchurch and Kaikoura districts will have an
approximate 5% increase in population. The
areas of greatest growth will be the Hurunui
District with a 10% growth rate and Selwyn and
Waimakariri Districts, where a 20% growth rate
is predicted.
Industry Profile
The following table compares Canterbury’s
regional economic structure against the
broader New Zealand economy. Plots to the
right side of the dotted line (e.g. trade and
tourism) indicate that the specified industry
accounts for a larger proportion of the Canter-
bury GDP than it does at a national level; i.e.
the industry is more ‘important’ to the Canter-
bury region than to the New Zealand economy
as a whole.
Fig 2: Canterbury’s Industrial Profile [NZ’s
Regional Economic Performance - Regional
Highlights 2006. NZIER for MED: p17]
The ‘square’ scatter plots are industries that
are fast-growing at a national level, while the
‘black diamond’ scatter plots are industries
that are slow-growing at a national level.
This diagram suggests that relative to the
national economy, Canterbury is:
• Highly reliant on various manufacturing
sectors;
• Relatively highly dependent on faster-
growing sectors (e.g. food, beverage and
tobacco manufacturing, trade, tourism and
other services);
• Under represented in the business services,
agriculture, natural resources and govern-
ment sectors, (which apart from business
services) are all relatively slow-growing
sectors at the national level.
Fast-growing regions tend to have a high
proportion of their regional economies focused
on fast-growing sectors, which may explain in
part why the Canterbury economy has grown
rapidly in recent years.
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4  NEW ZEALAND ELECTRICITY SYSTEM
New Zealand Electricity
System
The electricity system in New Zealand is
characterised by a long skinny high voltage
transmission system that runs through the
centre of the country.
The system transmission system is connected
between the North and South Island by a
1200MW HVDC submarine cable link across the
Cook Strait.  Due to the geographical isolation
of the country, there are no interconnections
with other power systems.
Annual generation is approximately 36,000
GWh and is dominated by hydro- power,
although this has decreased from approxi-
mately 75% in the 1990’s to around 60% of
total generation today. Other types of genera-
tion include gas (30%), coal (10%), geothermal
(5%), wind and various small scale biomass
and solar.
Transmission of generation is very important as
the geographical generation centre is at
Benmore in the lower South Island but the
geographical demand centre is in Hamilton.
This discrepancy requires electricity to be
transmitted long distances across the system.
Markets and Market
Participants
The electricity industry in New Zealand has four
main categories of market participation. These
are retail, distribution, transmission and
generation.
The participants that compete in the market
are the retailers and generation. Transmission
and distribution are considered to be natural
monopolies and so operate their own networks
with the regulations of electricity market. The
wholesale market is the market in which
generators compete to sell their electricity-to-
electricity retailers and other purchasers such
as major commercial and large industrial users.
Every half hour each retailer submits and
demand bid and each generator submits an
offer of generation. The System Operator takes
these bids and while considering security
implications and operational parameters,
dispatches the lowest cost generation for that
half hour. The retail market is a market where
electricity retailers compete to sell the electric-
ity they have purchased on the wholesale
market, to consumers including small-scale
industrial and commercial users and domestic
consumers. Retailers can also purchase
electricity directly from embedded generators
(smaller generators connected directly to
distribution networks such as biomass, landfill,
and wind turbine generation).
There are various views on how the market
achieves the overall objectives set out in the
Electricity Act and Governance documents but
these issues are beyond the scope of this
project. There is however a close linkage
between market price and investor confidence
and some of these risk issues will be discussed
in subsequent sections of the report.
The following diagram provides an illustration
of the New Zealand Electricity System in some
aspects. It is included in this report for
illustrative purposes, but reinforces the
complexity of the institutional, market and
regulatory arrangements, which ultimately
govern industry investments. Obtaining an
optimal solution within such a framework for
the physical delivery of electricity at least cost
is thus fraught with difficulty.
Electricity Sector
Governance
The following extract from the Draft Govern-
ment Policy Statement on Electricity Govern-
ance - August 2006 - provides the high-level
objectives for the industry:
“The Government Policy Statement sets out the
objectives and outcomes the Government
wants the Commission to give effect to. It is
made pursuant to s172ZK of the Electricity Act
1992 as amended by the Electricity Amendment
Act 20041.”
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This August 2006 version of the Government
Policy Statement is a limited revision of the
October 2004 Government Policy Statement.
To aid clarity, the original October 2004
paragraph numbers have been retained.
Security of Supply Background
35. A key priority of the Government is to
improve security of electricity supply.  …..
In the Government’s view, security of
supply is vital to achieving its objective of
sustainable economic development.
36. Key components of security of supply
are that:
• Sufficient generation capacity is built or
energy efficiency improvements made
to meet ongoing demand growth
• Hydro and thermal generating capacity
and fuels are appropriately managed, to
deal with the risks of extended dry
hydro periods better than we have in
the past
• The system has sufficient reserve
energy (plant and fuel, or contracted
demand response) to cope with
extreme dry sequences or other
unexpected supply disruptions
• The national grid and distribution lines
meet specified reliability objectives.
(Transmission and distribution issues
are covered in separate sections).
Security of Supply Policy
41 The Electricity Commission should
develop, consult on and publish a
security of supply policy.  The security
of supply policy should specify the
steps that the Commission will take at
various stages during a contingent
event such as an extended dry se-
quence.  It should also include its
procurement policies for reserve energy.
The overriding objective is to give as
much certainty as possible to the
market.
42 The Commission should develop and
publish an operational security of
supply standard, possibly expressed as
a loss of load expectation.
The EC is seen as the regulator in the industry
and oversees the markets by ensuring adher-
ence to market rules and making recommenda-
tions for new rules. The EC is also responsible
for ensuring that the electricity industry and
markets operate efficiently on a day-to-day and
longer-term basis. To achieve this it has
contractual service provider agreements with a
number of organisations for managing the
operations. The EC also oversees industry
governance, which includes consideration of
any alleged rule breaches by industry partici-
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pants and applications for exemptions to the
rules. All market participants must operate
within the market rules, with each type of
market participant operating under different
requirements and constraints.
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5  SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
Generation
The Canterbury region (excluding South
Canterbury), as defined in Transpower’s Annual
Planning Report, encompasses the area
bordered by and including Kaikoura in the
north, to Springston and Hororata in the south,
and west to Hororata and Coleridge power
station. The region’s main generation is the
Coleridge Power Station. This is a 45MW
capacity hydro generator that enters the core
grid at the Islington GXP.
The South Canterbury region covers the area
bordered by and including Ashburton in the
north and Livingstone and Oamaru in the
south. This region contributes a major portion
of the generation in the South Island, feeding
the 220 kV network from the Tekapo B, Ohau
and Waitaki Valley generation stations. The
complete list of generation plant is as follows:
• Tekapo A
• TekapoB
• Ohau A
• Ohau B
• Ohau C
• Twizel
• Aviemore
• Benmore
• Waitaki
Embedded generation plant contributes a very
small amount of generation to the region;
approximately 3GWh in the Orion network and
a 7.5MW hydro station embedded in South
Canterbury at Opuha, in addition to Montalto
(1.6 MW) and Highbank (26 MW) in the
Electricity Ashburton Network.
Transmission and Grid
Connections
Canterbury
Canterbury’s transmission network comprises
220 kV and 66 kV transmission circuits with
interconnecting transformers located at
Bromley and Islington. The major transmission
circuits feeding the central Canterbury
(Christchurch and surrounds) are the Tekapo
220kV, Livingston 220kV and Twizel 220kV (2
circuits). These transmission circuits connect at
either the Islington or Bromley substations.
Supplying areas north of the Canterbury region
are 3, 220kV circuits to Kikiwa. These lines
originate at the Islington substation.
There are a number of GXP’s supplying the
various sub-transmission and distribution
networks within Canterbury. The largest GXP’s
are at Islington and Bromley as these substa-
tions are primarily responsible for supplying
the large urban load in Christchurch. Both
these GXP’s supply power from the 220kV grid
while the rest of the region is supplied from
the 66 kV, including the:
• North Canterbury GXPs;
• Addington and Papanui GXPs; and
• Springston and Hororata GXPs.
Reactive support is provided at Christchurch
from synchronous condensers, static var
compensators and capacitor banks at Islington
and Bromley
South Canterbury
The South Canterbury region is supplied by
220 kV and 110 kV transmission circuits with
interconnecting transformers at Timaru and
Waitaki. The 110 kV network is normally
operated split at Studholme creating two radial
feeds:
• Timaru 220/110 kV interconnecting trans-
former banks supplying Albury, Tekapo A
and Temuka; and
• Waitaki 220/110 kV interconnecting trans-
former banks supplying Studholme and
Oamaru.
This region contributes a major portion of the
generation in the South Island, feeding the 220
kV network from the Tekapo B, Ohau and
Waitaki Valley generation stations.
North Canterbury
The North Canterbury area is considered by
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Transpower to be within the Canterbury region
itself. This area operates mostly at the
subtransmission level, where Transpower owns
the 66kV network. The 66kV network is
supplied predominantly through the Islington
and Bromley substations, along with the GXP’s
listed below.
• Southbrook 66kV/33kV
• Kaiapoi 66kV/11kV
• Ashley 66kV/11kV
• Waipara 220kV/66kV
• Culverden 220kV/33kV
• Kaikoura 66kV/33kV
Recent Transmission Projects
(Canterbury and South Canterbury):
A number of transmission projects have
recently been commissioned in early 2006
including:
• A third 220 kV circuit between Islington and
Kikiwa;
• 220 kV interconnection at Waipara and
Culverden; and
• A new GXP at Black Point.
The following diagrams show the existing
transmission network in the Canterbury plus
North Canterbury and South Canterbury regions
respectively.
Sub-transmission /
Distribution Networks
The Canterbury and South Canterbury regions
have four main areas of sub-transmission and
distribution. Each of these areas is owned and
operated by a separate company.
• Network Waitaki encompasses the areas of
North Otago and the Hakataramea
• Alpine Energy encompasses the region
between the Rangitata and Waitaki rivers
and inland to Mount Cook.
• Orion encompasses a large area including
Christchurch city, Banks Peninsula, the Port
Fig 4: Canterbury Transmission Grid [Source: Transpower APR 2005: 240]
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of Lyttelton and the farming communities of
the Canterbury plains between the
Waimakariri and Rakaia rivers and the high
country area inland to the main divide of
the Southern Alps
• MainPower operates the network in North
Canterbury from north of the Christchurch
urban region, inland to the Southern Alps
and northward to Kaikoura. The Mainpower
network also includes the Wigram area of
Christchurch, supplied from the Orion
Network rather than a Mainpower substa-
tion.
Alpine Energy
The Alpine Energy network is supplied from six
GXP’s
GXP Transformer Capacity
Timaru 220/110kV to 33/11kV 60MW
Temuka 110kV to 33kV 40MW
Studholme 110kV to 11kV 12 MW
Albury 110kV to 11kV 3MW
Tekapo 110kV to 33/11kV 2.5MW
Twizel 220kV to 33kV 2.5MW
The Network delivers approximately 640GWh of
energy and has a system Maximum Demand of
103MW.
Electricity Ashburton
The Electricity Ashburton network is supplied
from two GXP’s, both sourced from the same
Ashburton substation.
GXP Transformer
Ashburton 33kV 220kV to 33kV
Ashburton 66kV 220kV to 66kV
Together these GXP’s serve a load of approxi-
mately 95MW maximum demand and delivered
386.6 GWh. Recent investment in the network
has increased the amount of Subtransmission
Fig 5: South Canterbury Transmission Grid [Source: Transpower APR 2005:243]
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at the 66kV level and consequently the 33kV
load is reducing.  Toward 2008 it is predicted
that additional capacity will be needed in the
Ashburton region. Whether this capacity is
provided through additional transformer
capacity or a geographically separate substa-
tion offering an alternative GXP is yet to be
determined.
Network Waitaki
(Please note that this data incorporates the
entire Network Waitaki region, half of which is
classified as being in the Otago region and half
in the South Canterbury region. Further
information on the demand split within the
network will hopefully be available in the
future)
The Network Waitaki region is currently
supplied from 3 GXP’s.
GXP Transformer Capacity
Oamaru 110kV to 33kV 29 MW
Waitaki 200/110kV to 11/33kV 4.5MW
Twizel 200/33kV*
Black Point 110kV to 11kV
*is only used at backup for the Waitaki GXP
Together these GXP’s serve a maximum
demand load of about 32MW and 202GWh.
When the Black Pt irrigation is commissioned it
is expected that another 25GWh will be added
to annual consumption via this new GXP. Black
Point has only recently been commissioned so
load data for this GXP is unavailable.
Orion
The Orion network is connected to the grid at
9 GXP’s
GXP Transformer GXP Type
Islington 220/66kV to 33kV Urban
Bromley 220kV to 66kV Urban
Papanui 66kV to 11kV Urban
Addington 66kV to 11kV Urban
Springston 66kV to 33kV Rural
Hororata 66kV to 66/33kV Rural
Castle Hill 66kV to 11kV Rural
Arthurs Pass 66kV to 11kV Rural
Coleridge 66kV (generation) Rural
Urban GXPs
Islington and Bromley are 220kV substations,
and they provide connection of major circuits
from the southern power stations. Addington
and Papanui GXPs are supplied by 66kV lines
from the Islington 66kV bus. Apart from the
Bromley and Islington 33kV supply, all other
GXPs are dependent on the Islington 220/66kV
interconnection. A potential new GXP may be
investigated at Middleton to relieve a con-
straint on the Sockburn and Middleton 33kV
sub-transmission but this is not yet deter-
mined.
Rural GXPs
Orion takes power from the grid five rural
GXPs; the two main ones located at Springston
and Hororata. Each GXP is supplied via a
double 66kV line from the Islington 66kV bus.
Hororata supplies Orion at both 66kV and
33kV whilst supply at Springston is via the
33kV bus only. Hororata is also connected to
the West Coast via 66kV lines from the
Coleridge power station. The remainder of the
rural area is fed at 11kV from three small GXPs
at Arthurs Pass, Coleridge, and Castle Hill.
Combined, these GXP’s serve a maximum
demand of 577MW and 3190GWh of power. A
number of new district substations are envis-
aged in both the urban and rural area over the
next 10 year but the exact location and
configuration of these remains to be deter-
mined based on load growth and location.
MainPower
Transpower own and maintain the 66kV
subtransmission is this region. MainPower
operates a 33kV subtransmission system, a
large distribution system comprising both 22kV
and 11kV voltages, and a low voltage system.
MainPower’s network is connected to the grid
at six GXP’S:
GXP Transformer Capacity
Ashley 66kV/11kV Single phase
2 x 10 mVA
Culverden 220kV 2 x 25 mVA
Kaiapoi 66kV/11kV 20 mVA & single
phase 10mVA
Kaikoura 66kV/33kV 10/16 mVA
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Southbrook 66kV/33kV 2 x 30/40 mVA
Waipara 66kV/33kV 10/16 MW
During the 2005/2006 financial year the
demand in the MainPower network was 460.7
GWh’s. MainPower’s major customers are the
CHHP medium density panel mill at Ashley, the
Patience and Nicholson tool manufacturing
plant in Kaiapoi, the McAlpines sawmill and
Mitre 10 plant at Southbrook, the Belfast
timber kilns at Coutts Island, the Kaikoura
Dairy factory and several large supermarkets
and other commercial businesses scattered
over Rangiora, Kaiapoi and Kaikoura. Future
load growth may require a new GXP at
Rangiora East, particularly to reinforce the
system when the Pegasus township is built.
This new GXP is currently being consulted on.
Demand Characteristics and
Forecasted Growth
Current Demand
The current demand for Canterbury and South
Canterbury as given by the AMP’s (2005/2006
year) of the regional distribution companies is
outlined in the table below. Note that the value
for Network Waitaki included here is the whole
Network Waitaki network, including the area
inside the Otago region. It is hoped that the
more accurate South Canterbury only value will
be available in the near future.
Company Maximum Demand (MW) 
Network Waitaki 32 
Alpine Energy 103 
Electricity Ashburton 95 
Orion 577 
MainPower 79 
TOTAL 886 
Table 2: Regional Maximum Demand
The types of demand can be considered to be
in one of two very broad categories, either
urban or rural. Urban loads are mostly com-
prised of residential, commercial and industrial
demand whereas the majority of rural demand
is irrigation load.
Network companies are reporting load factors
of between approximately 60 and 65%, this
being quite high in some areas such as
Network Waitaki (which is a predominantly
rural load). In rural areas where load growth is
predominantly in irrigation, the load factor is
expected to decrease over time. This is due to
the daily load factor (in summer) being high
but the annual load factor of irrigation being
low. In networks such as Orion’s, the load
factor is expected to remain steady, as the
effect of irrigation on load factor is offset by
commercial and industrial loads that have high
annual load factors.
Forecasted Demand
The demand forecast for the Canterbury and
South Canterbury regions as set out in the
Statement of Opportunities (SOO) produced by
the Electricity Commission. The following table
shows this forecasted demand.
This forecast raises a number of questions
about its derivation and assumptions. By
looking at the Canterbury and South Canter-
bury load as a percentage of the total national
load it would seem that the Canterbury region
load growth matches that of the rest of the
country. This seems an unlikely situation when
projected population growth is much higher for
much of the North Island and Canterbury has a
reducing population. Whether this forecast is
accurate to use for Canterbury is up for debate.
Urban Issues
The Canterbury region has the largest urban
load with the major driver for demand increase
being influenced by ECAN’s Clean Air Policy
(CAP). This program aims to enable Canterbury
to meet the national air quality standard that is
to be implemented by 2012. The impact of the
CAP is to restrict the use of old style fuel
burners and substitute their use with ‘clean’
alternatives. To date approximately 65% of
conversions have been to heat pumps. The
continuation of the CAP and the switch to
alternative heating options is predicted to
increase peak winter demand by 35 MW in the
next seven to ten years. This forecast is based
on an average of 6MW growth per year. The
increase in heat pumps may also lead to
increased summer peaks due to an increase in
air conditioning load though definitive data for
this is not yet available. The urban load growth
will particularly affect the capacity requirements
at the urban GXP’s of Islington, Bromley,
Papanui and Addington.
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The urban load duration curve is very flat, in
that for most of the year the load deviates very
little from its median value. The following
diagram taken from Orion’s AMP 2006 shows
the historical changes on the load duration
curve where it can be seen that the maximum
demand on the system only occurs for a small
number of half hours per year. The historical
trend shows that the demand peaks are
occurring less frequently, resulting in flatter
load profile.
Rural Issues
The largest issue in the rural category is the
increase in irrigation load. In the last five to
ten years this growth has been very steep
although forecasts looking forward indicate this
growth to slow. The slowing of growth is due
to a number of factors including:
• ECAN’s restrictions on ground water
allocation
• Land use in some areas is approaching full
irrigation potential
• Interruptible load arrangements to cover
short term faults
• Requirements of the central plains irrigation
scheme.
Forecasting peak load growth due to irrigation
is quite difficult due to the use of irrigation
being very strongly correlated with weather
conditions. The following graph shows the rural
demand growth trend and its volatility, mostly
due to vagaries in the weather.
Regional Demand Growth
Overview
Most networks within the Canterbury and
South Canterbury region are seeing annual
energy (GWh) growth rates between 2 and 3%
and peak demand growth rates of between 1%
and 2%. Orion does a lot of work on peak
shifting its load, resulting in its peak demand
growth rate being at the lower end (1.3%
averaged over 20 years)
These growth rates are expected to continue
into the foreseeable future. Comparing current
Yr 
Canterbury 
(MW) 
South 
Canterbury 
(MW) 
Total Sth 
Island 
(MW) 
Total Nth 
Island 
(MW) 
Total 
NZ 
(MW) 
Cant + 
Sth Cant 
as % of 
NZ total 
2005 744 81 2,094 4,230 6,324 13.0 
2006 769 82 2,139 4,364 6,503 13.1 
2007 793 84 2,185 4,500 6,685 13.1 
2008 818 86 2,231 4,640 6,871 13.2 
2009 843 88 2,276 4,779 7,055 13.2 
2010 867 89 2,319 4,913 7,232 13.2 
2011 890 90 2,360 5,043 7,403 13.2 
2012 912 92 2,400 5,172 7,572 13.3 
2013 934 93 2,438 5,299 7,737 13.3 
2014 956 94 2,476 5,423 7,899 13.3 
2015 977 95 2,513 5,550 8,063 13.3 
2016 998 96 2,550 5,675 8,225 13.3 
2017 1,020 97 2,585 5,800 8,385 13.3 
2018 1,040 98 2,620 5,921 8,541 13.3 
2019 1,060 99 2,654 6,042 8,696 13.3 
2020 1,080 100 2,686 6,161 8,847 13.3 
2021 1,100 101 2,718 6,279 8,997 13.3 
2022 1,120 101 2,748 6,395 9,143 13.4 
2023 1,138 102 2,778 6,510 9,288 13.4 
2024 1,157 102 2,807 6,623 9,430 13.4 
2025 1,176 103 2,835 6,734 9,569 13.4 
Table 3: Regional Demand Forecast 2005-2026
NOTE: SI regional Peak Demand Projections (including high & low estimates based on
90% confidence limits) may be found in Table 27 of the SOO [EC SOO 2005:127-128].
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demand with the demand forecast from the
Electricity Commission shows that demand is
currently tracking the medium demand growth
forecast of 2% quite well.
Issues
Maximum peak demand is a hard quantity to
predict as it is very dependant on the weather,
which in the Canterbury/South Canterbury
region can be quite volatile. This volatility is
present in both summer, from irrigation (a dry
year results in large irrigation load) and in
winter (from heating). If the system is running
very close to its limit then unexpected cold
weather can result in capacity constraints that
were not planned for.
Many of the urban GXP’s in Orion’s network are
forecast to run into firm capacity1 constraints
Fig 6: Christchurch Urban Network Load Duration Curve [Orion AMP 2006:17]
Fig 7: Rural Summer Maximum Demand Trends [Orion AMP 2006:55]
1 Firm Capacity is the capacity of a site should one item of
equipment fail.
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within the next 5 to 10 years. Islington and
Bromley are the worst affected, with potential
problems also surfacing at Addington,
Springston and Hororata. Some projects are
already planned to relieve or partially relieve
some of these constraints.
Demand growth in Canterbury and north in
Nelson/Marlborough is putting significant strain
on the transmission system running from the
southern generators up the island. Transpower
has recently commissioned another circuit
north of Christchurch to Kikiwa but capacity on
the lines running into Christchurch is already
stretched and will continue to worsen.
Transpower is looking at a number of alterna-
tive solutions to this issue. They are proposing
a number of small capacity increments using
improved bussing and transformer ratings/
capacity in locations such as Islington, Bromley
and Ashburton and series compensation of the
transmission circuits supplying Canterbury.
These projects may culminate in a new
transmission circuit from the southern genera-
tor region into Christchurch in the future.
Regional Flows
Interregional Flows
During normal operating conditions the
Canterbury region receives power from the
southern generators. Flows into Canterbury
come from the south and flows out head
toward the West Coast and north to Nelson
and Marlborough. As Canterbury is so depend-
ant on power produced outside of the region
having adequate transmission to accommodate
the flows servicing local loads is very impor-
tant. The following diagram shows the typical
flow of power from southern New Zealand into
Canterbury and further north to Nelson/
Marlborough.
Transmission constraints are the major influ-
ence on interregional flows. The risks associ-
ated with constraints in transmission include:
• Volatile nodal prices at periods of high
demand
• Security and operational issues during
normal operation and/or contingent
situations
• Lack of investment in industrial/commercial
opportunities due to uncertainty of supply
and price.
System Risks
A number of factors combined with the system
assets create risks in investment, operation
and security of the system. Patterns of energy
use, interregional flows, age of assets, energy
losses and asset utilisation all add to the risks
Figure 8: New Zealand core grid maximum transfer capability [Meridian ARTSS Report 2005:3]
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the system faces. Quantifying the level of risk
to the system will involve analysis for each
issue and sourcing the appropriate data.
Patterns of Energy Use
Different types of loads have different effects
on the distribution of demand across the day
and the year. Residential load has a low load
factor and is a big contributor to demand
peaks while commercial and industrial loads
have high load factors. Other issues for
Canterbury surrounding patterns of energy use
are irrigation loads which as mentioned
previously have a high daily load factor but a
low annual load factor. Development of the
different types of load growth may need to be
predicted in greater detail in order to better
plan and/or lobby for the incremental and large
scale investments necessary. The risks of not
having a good forecast of energy use develop-
ment include:
• stranded assets from investing in the wrong
areas
• small incremental investments becoming
superfluous due to necessary large up-
grades later on
• system capability being constantly
stretched
• Volatility in prices resulting from capacity
constraints and uncertain investments.
The information used to track and forecast
patterns of energy use will include; annual
regional land use plans, energy policies,
building consents, population growth, GDP for
Canterbury and New Zealand, policies that
attract or repel investment in energy intensive
industries and long weather predictions (eg
climate change, El Nino).
Age of Assets
There is a vast range in the age of assets
throughout the networks in Canterbury.
Continual upgrade of assets occurs and
maintenance schedules are planned accord-
ingly. As assets age they are more likely to:
• Be inefficient causing higher system losses
• Be the cause of faults impacting system
security
• Require more maintenance resulting in
more outages to get maintenance work
done.
While the majority of power system assets are
designed to be in active use for 50 years or
more they often require partial investment to
upgrade their efficiencies or useful lifespan.
Older assets require parts that may be hard to
source and hence may not be immediately
available during fault situations. This results in
potentially longer outages, reducing the level
of service to customers. The risks of aging
assets include:
• Hard to obtain repair parts easily resulting
in longer outage times
• Potential lower level of service to custom-
ers due to faults and outages resulting in
customer loss or complaints.
• An inefficient system.
Gaining an overall impression of the age of
assets may be hard to determine as it will vary
widely between assets types. Perhaps a more
useful measure would be the expected life
remaining in assets and whether they are
currently scheduled for replacement before
their life expectancy is reached. Alongside this,
some analysis of the risk associated with
assets at their current age, defined in terms of
risk of failure causing an outage may be useful
in quantifying the risk associated with the
asset age. System planners usually take into
account many of these age risks when consid-
ering upgrade plans for their network.
Energy Losses and Delivery
Efficiencies
By reducing energy losses and increasing
efficiencies, a greater output (energy utilised) is
received for a smaller or similar size input
(power generated).  Not taking full advantage
of fewer losses and greater efficiency results in
risks that include:
• Reaching capacity limits faster than
necessary
• Wasted energy
• Using more generation resources than
necessary.
Potentially resulting in:
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• Generation constraints
• Transmission Constraints
• High prices and nodal volatility.
Information on losses and efficiencies is likely
to be a combination of the asset design
information, the configuration it is used in and
the age of the asset. This would give very
detailed information for particular areas but a
more general approach may be a sufficient
level of detail.
A following systems approach would provide a
greater insight on a regional level:
Energy in(interregional flow)  = energy utilised
+  energy out(interregional flow) +  losses
Asset Utilisation
Asset utilisation is a balancing act between
getting a good return on the capital invest-
ment, i.e. using the asset as much as possible
to improve income, and making sure there is
enough spare capacity to accommodate load
growth for a suitable period of time. It is the
trade off between large scale investment and
small incremental investment.
Where the need for an investment to accom-
modate growth is obvious, fairly certain and
economic there is less risk in investing in
assets that may not be fully utilised initially. If
there is uncertainty surrounding the investment
such as the size, location or best improvement
to be made, small incremental investments are
often useful while the uncertainty resolves
itself. The level of uncertainty and hence the
risk that is prepared to be taken when deciding
on large scale vs incremental may depend on
the size and cost of the investment decision.
The risks associated with large scale and
incremental investment in terms of asset
utilisation includes:
• Low asset utilisation as a result of
unrealised growth, overinvestment or large
scale upgrades can result in:
–  Stranded assets
–  Wasted capital expenditure
–  Low return on investment
• High asset utilisation as a result of incre-
mental investment or higher than predicted
demand growth results in:
– Greater return on investment
– The system may face constraints more
often, resulting in volatile prices
– Greater disruption (lost of supply to
customers) to the system when the
asset is removed during faults or
maintenance
– Harder to find windows for maintenance
due to high loading conditions. This
may result in longer periods between
maintenance than the ideal, increasing
the risk of faults.
Information about asset utilisation is most
likely to be reflected in system constraints.
Assets that are frequently implicated in a
system constraint are likely to have high
utilisation. Finding assets with low utilisation
would require comparing ratings of equipment
with average and peak energy flows (or
appropriate measure for the asset concerned).
Another option for identifying areas that may
have high asset utilisation would be studying
nodal volatility. High volatility may indicate
stretched capacity or constraints and hence
high asset utilisation.
These system risks are not well understood
particularly with how they relate to and impact
on the vulnerabilities of the power system.
Page 33Canterbury Regional Energy Strategy Project
6  Level of Service
In determining the appropriate level of service
in terms of reliability of supply, it is first
necessary to review the regulatory require-
ments as applied to the grid owner and
operator, Transpower. These requirements are
summarized in the Electricity Act and Regula-
tions and more specifically in the Electricity
Governance Rules (EGR).
Grid Reliability Standard
The EGR’s reference the Grid Reliability Stand-
ard (GRS) recently developed and issued by
the Electricity Commission. An extract from the
GRS document is given as follows:
Approach to Grid Reliability
2.4 The key role for GRS is to provide a
basis, in conjunction with the Grid Invest-
ment Test (GIT), for planning and develop-
ment of the national transmission grid.
2.5 The development of transmission
networks has, until recently, been largely
undertaken according to “deterministic”
standards based on network redundancy
criteria, often referred to as “N-k”.
Transpower has applied an “N-1” criterion
to its core grid planning, typically seeking
to maintain supply during single credible
contingencies.
2.6 The alternative to this is to adopt a
“probabilistic” approach to grid planning
and development. This typically involves
estimating the probability of contingencies,
estimating the expected loss of supply that
could occur, and estimating the costs of
the loss of supply. Within this probabilistic
framework, investments are made in the
grid when there is a clear net economic
benefit.
2.7 Reliability can be defined as definitive
planning standards that must be met
regardless of economics, or it can be
regarded as a target to be achieved
provided the required investment meets an
economic test.
The GRS specifies that the EC Board determine
the actual grid reliability standards to be
applied including the purpose, principles and
content of the standards. The standards take
into account the Grid Investment Test (GIT)
which determines whether a new grid upgrade
project is based on sound economic invest-
ment criteria. Transpower prepares Grid
Upgrade Plans (GUP) for submission to the EC
who then determines if the project should go
ahead.
The content of the GRS can be based on one
or more standards for reliability of the grid and
may have a primary standard and other
standards to reflect differing circumstances in
different regions supplied by the grid. The
clauses of the GRS thus do not apply prescrip-
tive rules for reliability standards but allow for
a number of different levels of reliability across
the power supply network. It is thus up to the
grid planner and operator, Transpower, to
determine which reliability standard should
apply to the core grid with regional interests
having an input into the decision for their
specific areas.
Transpower’s Reliability Standards
Transpower’s reliability standards are described
in a March 2005 document entitled North
Island 400 kV Project, Main Transmission
System Planning Criteria. The document refers
to transmission system reliability as incorporat-
ing assessment of two basic aspects of the
system; adequacy and security, as defined by
the North American Electric Reliability Council
(NERC) in the USA. The NERC document defines
these terms as:
Adequacy as “The ability of the electric
systems to supply aggregate electrical demand
and energy requirements of their customers at
all times, taking into account scheduled and
reasonably expected unscheduled outages of
system elements”
Security as “The ability of the electric systems
to withstand sudden disturbances such as
electric short circuits or unanticipated loss of
system elements.”
Transpower has added another two terms to
describe system reliability when considering
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the state of the transmission system. These
are:
Satisfactory State when “The transmission
system can supply aggregate electrical demand
and energy requirements of their customers at
all times.” and
Secure State when “The transmission system
can satisfy the test for system adequacy for all
reasonably expected conditions including
scheduled and unscheduled outages of system
elements and return to a satisfactory state
after a sudden disturbance.”
Transpower’s reliability standard is based on
the deterministic approach as described in the
GRS above. This approach, which is applied
worldwide, is further described:
“The main interconnected transmission
system shall be planned and developed to
maintain N-1 security criterion, meaning
that the system is in a secure state with all
transmission facilities in service and in a
satisfactory state following credible single
contingency events……The loss of an
element could be either planned (as part of
scheduled maintenance) or unplanned (as
an unforeseen event) either by inadvertent
disconnection or as a consequence of a
fault occurring in/on the affected element.”
Transpower plans and operates the grid to the
n-1 security criterion and consequently this
measure is a significant contributor to any
upgrade plans that are developed.
Furthermore, Transpower assesses the n-1
security of the grid in accordance with the
Electricity Commission’s Electricity Governance
Rules (EGR), particularly Schedule F3 of the
EGR’s “Grid Reliability Standards” (GRS).
Clause 4 of the GRS states that:
”For the purpose of clause 3, the grid
satisfies the grid reliability standards if:
4.1 the power system is reasonably
expected to achieve a level of reliability
at or above the level that would be
achieved if all economic reliability
investments were to be implemented;
and
4.2 with all assets that are reasonably
expected to be in service, the power
system would remain in a satisfactory
state during and following any single
credible contingency event occurring on
the core grid.”
In Part A, Interpretation, Section 1 Defined
Terms, of the EGRs it defines a single
credible contingency event as:
“single credible contingency event means
an individual credible contingency event
comprising any one of the following:
(a) a single transmission circuit interrup-
tion;
(b) the failure or removal from operational
service of a single generating unit;
(c) an HVDC link single pole interruption;
(d) the failure or removal from service of a
single bus section;
(e) a single inter-connecting transformer
interruption;
(f) the failure or removal from service of a
single shunt connected reactive compo-
nent;”
In line with the GRS, Transpower does not
consider a tower failure as a single credible
contingency event and in particular does not
consider the loss of a double circuit line as a
single credible contingency event.
Also, in line with the GRS, Transpower does
not consider the loss of a whole substation to
be a single credible contingency event.
However, Transpower is currently reviewing the
security of Islington and Twizel Substations,
among others, and it may be that in a future
grid upgrade plan that the low probability, high
consequence event involving the loss of either
substation may warrant some form of mitigat-
ing measure.
However, there is an exception to the n-1
criterion where Transpower has further elabo-
rated on its reliability obligations in its Annual
Planning Report issued in June 2006 as
follows:
Transpower considers that in some situa-
tions generation assets cannot reasonably
be expected to be in service. Specifically,
for major load centers that are dependent
on local generation for supply security,
Transpower plans to an n-g-1 reliability
level.
That is, the system remains in a satisfac-
tory state following a forced outage of:
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• any transmission component (see single
credible contingencies below); and
• an outage of the single largest genera-
tor.
As a result, Transpower considers the following
interpretation falls within the definition
provided:
Auckland is an example of where an n-g-1
planning standard is used because of the
comparative low reliability of generating plant
(thermal plant in particular), the criticality of
that generation for Auckland, and the size of
the Auckland load.
Consequently, a review of the EC’s GRS for
single credible contingencies may be appropri-
ate to cover the above cases where a true n-1
criterion is not satisfied for all contingencies as
outlined in the EEA Guidelines and the ODV
Manual.
In terms of the EGR Section 12A, Transpower
has included a review of the main grid n-1
security criterion in Appendix A3 of its Annual
Planning Report for 2006. A summary of the
review is provided later in this report in the
Table of Backbone Issues and Resolving
Projects. However, a more detailed evaluation
of n-1 adequacy and security criteria for each
regional GXP may have to wait Stage 2.
Standards for Security of
Supply in New Zealand
Each market participant has the ability to plan
and operate their assets to supply their own
desired level of security. There is currently no
standard that must be applied uniformly across
the system, only guidelines that companies
may pick and chose as to what they imple-
ment.  A useful basis for guidelines on security
of supply is the document produced by the
Electricity Engineers Association (EEA) in June
2000 entitled “Guidelines for Security of Supply
in New Zealand Electricity Networks”. The
Guidelines state that they are not intended to
be mandatory but, in the opinion of EEA, they
are considered to be good practice for applica-
tion in New Zealand. They are specifically
intended for distribution network or lines
companies and can be used for their Asset
Management Plan disclosures under the
Electricity Act (Information Disclosure) Regula-
tions. The Guidelines were developed after the
Ministerial Inquiry into the Auckland Central
Business District power failure in 1998 recom-
mended that guidelines be prepared for
security of supply in New Zealand electricity
networks.
Table 5 (overpage) provides the Security of
Supply Guidelines as developed by the EEA:
The Electricity Commission has recently
completed a review of grid security including
consultation with electricity industry partici-
pants and major customers. The review
concluded that loads above 150MW must have
N-1 security and that loads below 150MW will
be subject to probabilistic economic analysis
on a case-by-case basis.  While the EEA
guidelines provide a basis for companies to
base their security criteria on, they are by no
means universally adopted throughout the
country. Regionally it may be that the guide-
lines do not adequately reflect the security
requirements of different load types as many
areas have unique demand profiles.
System Economic Valuation
Methodology
The 2005 Report of the Optimised Deprival
Valuation (ODV) of Transpower’s System Fixed
Assets as at 30 June 2005 has the following
relevant comments:
“At present the security standard applied
by Transpower to consumers, Distribution
Line Businesses (DLBs), and other large
private industrial consumers differs signifi-
cantly from area to area, but in general
follows the (n - 1) criterion, with security to
the (n - 2) level only used for a small
number of specific industrial consumers.
Table A3.1 below shows the security
guidelines for transmission equipment
planning.
Moreover, a substantial number of smaller
supply points are provided with power
through either one transmission line or one
transformer; either element controlled by a
single circuit breaker will meet just the (n)
criterion.
Examination of the existing system indi-
cates that in many instances the (n - 1)
criterion is not met.”
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Table 5: EEA “Normal Security of Supply Guidelines”
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It is noteworthy that the following table from
the ODV Handbook resembles that in the EEA
Guidelines with loads over 600MW requiring
more than one major terminal station for
supply in the region. According to the EEA
Guidelines and the ODV Handbook, both
Auckland and Christchurch do not comply with
this criterion. Transpower is taking steps to
provide an improved n-1 supply to the Auck-
land CBD by arranging to feed the new 400kV
transmission line directly into the Pakuranga
substation and not Otahuhu substation as
originally planned. This should satisfy the n-1
substation criterion for loads over 600MW.
Presently nearly all the supply into Christchurch
comes through Islington substation. Christch-
urch is not as vulnerable as Auckland as the
system can supply about 50% of the Christch-
urch load through another substation at
Bromley though the n-1 criterion is still violated
for the Canterbury region.
Orion’s Security of Supply Standard
An internal report on Orion’s Security of Supply
Standard (SSS) Review in September 2006
highlighted very useful information about the
system in the Canterbury region.
Orion believes that its present SSS should be
modified to account for the optimum balance
between its network costs and the Value of
Lost Load (VoLL) to its customers.
It is anticipated that the revised SSS will
produce savings on capital investment but will
also slightly reduce the reliability performance
of its new substations. Orion believes that this
reduction will not be material and its overall
reliability performance will still be better than
most other lines companies in New Zealand.
The savings produced with this approach will
allow increased expenditure on maintenance
and operations. Orion’s revised SSS will be a
mix of a refined deterministic N-1 criterion and
Table 6: ODV “Security Guidelines for Transmission Equipment Planning”
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a probabilistic evaluation based on the VoLL
approach for major customers. The SSS will
also specify times for various sizes of loads
within which supply should be restored
following different numbers and types of faults.
It is hoped this will give a better balance
between cost and reliability. This is also in line
with the time based approach in the EEA
Guide.
Orion has a separate security arrangement in
rural areas. The majority or rural load is
irrigation and security arrangements for this
load are based on Orion’s interruptible irriga-
tion policy. Rural security is covered in Orion’s
revised SSS as follows:
“Rural network capacity is dominated by
the requirement to meet irrigation load
growth.   The value of electricity to irriga-
tors has been assessed by ‘Agri Business’
and the findings presented to a representa-
tive irrigation group.  Following this
consultation, Orion has updated its
interruptible irrigation policy.  .  It is for
this reason that the urban security MW
thresholds have been applied to the rural
network with slightly increased switching/
restoration times reflecting the increased
travelling times involved.  Over time, it is
anticipated that the rural customer mix will
change as Rolleston and Lincoln residential
development occurs and it would be
prudent to reassess the rural economic
analysis on a regular basis (3-5 years).”
Power Quality
Power quality is defined by a group of at-
tributes that reflect the performance of the
electrical power supply. The three most
important power quality attributes that can be
controlled by regional distribution companies
are:
• steady state voltage supplied to consum-
ers;
• level of harmonics or distortion of the
power supply; and
• number and magnitude of transient voltage
excursions.
Regional distribution companies can only
control the power quality to their customers to
the level of power quality that the distribution
company receives off the grid. That is, should
the grid power quality be poor then the
distribution company cannot do much to
improve the supply they receive and ultimately
pass onto their own customers. Each network
contracts with Transpower for a particular
power quality at GXP’s
Steady state voltage
Steady state voltage is mandated by regulation
as 230Volts ±6%.
Unanticipated consumer loads are the largest
contributing factor to voltage excursions. Orion
has a target voltage quality level of no more
than 70 proven complaints per year
Transpower allows for a ±10% violation on the
220kV and 110kV grid. This standard was
exceeded once during the time period March
05 and February 06.
Harmonics and Distortion
Harmonics or distortion are most often intro-
duced to the system through connection of
electronic equipment. The level of allowable
harmonics is mandated by regulation and Orion
uses harmonic allocation methods defined in
IEC/Joint Australian/NZ standards to determine
acceptable consumer levels of harmonic
injection. Most problems and complaints from
customers are a result of connected equipment
owned and operated by the complainant.
Where this is the case Orion will investigate
and may require the offending equipment to be
removed from the system.
Transient Voltage Excursions
Transient voltage excursions vary in frequency
and magnitude. They are often referred to as
sags, swells, surges or flicker. The Orion
network is operated to a joint Australian/New
Zealand and international standard and the
effects of voltage excursions are aimed to be
minimised.
Common Quality Obligations
In Section II of the EGR, issued on 8 June
2006, the principal performance obligations of
the system operator are to:
“2.1  Avoid cascade failure
Act as a reasonable and prudent system
operator with the objective of dispatching
assets made available in a manner which
avoids the cascade failure of assets
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resulting in the loss of demand and arising
from frequency or voltage excursions and
supply and demand imbalances.”
The standard discusses other quality of supply
issues which include; managing time errors,
limiting harmonic levels, limiting voltage flicker
levels and voltage imbalances giving rise to
negative phase sequence voltages and currents
in the network.
Transpower in its role as system operator must
also regulate the frequency of the system. The
standards that it must meet are to keep
frequency between 49.8 – 50.2 Hz. This is done
by contracting generators to be the frequency
keeper. There is one for the north island and
one for the south island. Excursions from this
frequency band are recorded by Transpower.
The excursions from Mar05 – Feb 06 are shown
in the following table.
Overview of Transpower and Orion
Supply Quality
The following extract from Transpower’s Annual
Report for 2005/2006 gives the main system
availability and system minutes lost for the
year to 30 June 2006. Apart from the Auckland
outage on 12 June 2006, which contributed
29.8 system minutes, the overall results were
close to target.
The following extract from Orion’s Network
Quality Report for 2006 indicates that Orion’s
performance is one of the best in New Zealand
and compares favourably with international
results for the same criteria.
Table 9: Distribution Network System Reliabil-
ity [Orion Network Quality Report 2006:4]
Trends in Orion’s supply quality can be summa-
rized by the measures of SAIDI and SAIFI.
These two measures are defined as:
• SAIDI, or System Average Interruption
Duration Index, measures the average
number of minutes per annum that a
consumer is without electricity.
• SAIFI, or System Average Interruption
Frequency Index, measures the average
number of times per annum that a con-
sumer is without electricity.
Extreme weather events can have a large
impact of the recorded SAIDI and SAIFI
measurements of a network and so it is more
informative to look at the long-term trends of
Table 7: NZ System frequency Performance 2005 [Transpower]
System Reliability Measures Actual  2005/06  Target 2005/06 
     
High Voltage alternating current (HVAC) availability 
 
98.6% 
 
98.9% 
     
High Voltage direct current 
(HVDC) availability - overall 
Pole 1 
Pole 2 
 
 
95.2% 
92.0% 
98.7% 
 
 
94.0% 
92.5% 
95.6% 
     
Unplanned Supply Interruptions 
 
38 system minutes 
 
 <9.0 system minutes 
Table 8: Transmission Network System Reliability [Transpower]
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these figures. Orion’s AMP illustrates their
network’s performance in the graphs shown in
Figure 9.
A comparison with national and international
utilities is provided in the following extract
from Orion’s 2006 Network Quality Report. It is
reassuring to note that the reliability of supply
to the Christchurch CBD is secure with alterna-
tive routes and other sources of supply.
Unfortunately the >600MW load criterion for n-1
substations in a region is still not completely
satisfied as outlined previously in the section
on Standard of Security of Supply.
Our research into national and international
comparisons indicates that our urban network
reliability is above average while our rural
network reliability is slightly below average. We
also measure the reliability of our supply to
the central business district (CBD) area of
Christchurch. A reliable electricity supply is
critical to the CBD area given the economic
impact of any electricity outage6. Conse-
quently, our supply to the CBD is very secure
with a number of alternative sources available
to restore supply in the event of a fault. The
level of reliability witnessed by Christchurch’s
CBD is in line with that of Australian cities.
Unfortunately New Zealand CBD figures are not
available for comparison as, to the best of our
knowledge, Orion is the only New Zealand
network company to publicly disclose CBD
reliability statistics.
Table 10 compares Orion’s performance in the
Christchurch CBD relative to a number of CBD’s
in Australia. The figures suggest that Orion
compares well with Melbourne and Sydney
while Brisbane performs much better.
Overall it appears on past performance that
both Transpower as System Operator and
network companies achieve the performance
targets for power quality that they set out for
themselves or by regulation. Intuitively a
constrained system would make these targets
more difficult to meet and should the system
become constrained over a long period of time,
it would be expected that this stretching of
system capacity would be reflected in the
ability to maintain power quality. While power
quality targets and related violations can be
used as an indicator of a highly constrained
system it is widely acknowledged that system
security measures give the earliest warnings of
impending system constraints and stretched
capacity. The following section investigates
security measures and vulnerabilities for
Canterbury.
Fig 9: Network Performance [Orion Network Quality Report 2006:6]
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Table 10: International Comparison of Distribution Network Performance
[Orion Network Quality Report 2006:9]
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7  SECURITY OF SUPPLY
System reliability can be considered to be the
summation of system adequacy and system
security. Adequacy and security are conceptu-
ally different. Security is the ability of the
system to continue supplying load under a
fault situation whereas adequacy is the ability
of the system to supply loads under different
operating conditions and provide adequate
capacity in the system to provide reasonable
cover for unseen events (e.g. dry years, cold
weather). This section focuses on planning for
security, the measures used and the
vulnerabilities in security in Canterbury.
Security can be defined in many ways and the
level of security planned and invested for can
be different in different regions. Based on the
current n-1 security criteria used for planning
by Transpower a number of vulnerabilities in
security are seen in the Canterbury region at
the core and non core grid level. These
vulnerabilities in the grid are highlighted by
the differences in security criteria at distribu-
tion network level. Distribution networks often
have alternative security standards for different
load groups that don’t necessarily match the
security criteria of n-1 used by Transpower.
System adequacy is addressed in the ECs
Statement of Opportunities (SOO) document
and is also considered by the region’s network
companies in their Asset Management Plans.
The system adequacy aspects for the Canter-
bury region will be covered in the following
section on the Regional SOO.
Security Planning Criteria/
Measures
Security planning can be undertaken in two
ways, either probabilistically or
deterministically. Deterministic planning is the
type used by Transpower and is a deterministic
standard such as n-k where supply is main-
tained during credible contingencies.
Transpower uses an n-1 criterion for the core
grid with the exception of Auckland that has a
n-g -1 criteria. The ‘g’ refers to local generation
that is relied on to provide security of supply.
Probabilistic planning typically involves
estimating the probabilities of contingencies,
estimating the expected loss of supply and the
resulting costs from this loss of supply. Using
probabilistic planning, investments are made
when there is a clear net economic benefit.
Either method of security planning has its
place but probabilistic planning has a major
hurdle to overcome. This is the way in which a
value is placed on the load lost during an
outage. This value of lost load or VoLL is very
different across the country, within regions and
across load types. Being able to quantify this
VoLL value is extremely important in having an
accurate probabilistic planning process.
Value of Lost Load
The Value of Lost Load (VoLL) is a measure of
the value of unserved energy. While current
practise plans to maintain core grid security to
a deterministic n-1 criterion there are some
suggestions that using VoLL may give a more
useful measure in order to plan for security of
supply.
Using VoLL gives an indication of the willing-
ness of consumers to forgo their electricity
supply in an adverse event. If consumers have
a low value of VoLL, they are prepared to wear
the risk of having supply interruption and
hence are unlikely to wish to pay for n-1
security investments. Alternatively some
consumers may have a very high VoLL e.g.
hospitals so they will either willingly pay for
increased security or provide their own backup
systems. While this use of VoLL seems to be a
suitable solution to the security issue, there
are two main drawbacks. The first being that
currently there is an inconsistent value for the
VoLL across the system and secondly that
providing differing levels of security within a
meshed urban system is a very complicated
prospect, if not impossible.
The following table illustrates data extracted
from Orion’s internal document, Security of
Supply Review.
These differences illustrate that different loads
have a different risk acceptance regarding
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security of supply. An issue for consideration
with these values particularly between Orion
and the EC is that Orion values the unserved
energy at a lower value than the EC. This has
security planning implications when consider-
ing the value of unserved energy in the
Canterbury region.
Transpower and the EC use the value of
$20,000MWh ($20/kWh = $20,000/Mwh) for
unserved energy or VoLL but Transpower uses a
deterministic n-1 planning criteria for invest-
ment rather than unserved energy. In recent
feedback to the Electricity Commission on the
GRS it was noted that:
• Several submitters (in particular Contact,
Meridian, MRP, Vector) note that not every
MWh of unserved energy has the same
value, and that different types of customers
will value MWh differently at different
times. The frequency, depth and duration of
unserved energy also have bearing on the
value, as does the timeliness of notice of
impending outage.
• Meridian suggests that the use of a value
of unserved energy is a bias towards
reliability at grid exit points, and that a
cost of un-dispatched energy should also
be incorporated. Meridian also seeks
clarification as to how the proposed value
of unserved energy of $20,000/MWh is
reconciled to the value of security of
supply, the trigger price for reserve energy,
and the standing offer price for reserve
energy at Whirinaki.
• Some submitters (in particular Northpower)
consider that the assessment of unserved
energy needs to be broadened to include
the total costs of disruption, and not just
for the duration of the outage. Additional
costs might include, for instance, lost
production time restarting machines and
destroyed product.
The EC suggests that it will undertake a review
of the nature and value of unserved energy in
the next 2 – 3 years.
System Operator Security
Requirements
Transpower as System Operator is responsible
for managing the system security constraints
on a real-time basis and for notifying custom-
ers of any issues before they arise. If con-
straints are breached then official notices are
required to be issued and these are notified on
Transpower’s website. It is interesting that
currently there are over 600 constraints on the
main transmission system and it is
Transpower’s intention to reduce this number
through Grid Upgrade Projects (GUP) as soon
as practicable. The constraints put upon the
system are designed to ensure that the system
can provide a certain level of power quality
and security, to ensure safe operation of the
system (i.e. to ensure cascade failure doesn’t
occur) and to operate the system in an
economic least cost fashion. The Grid Reliabil-
ity Standard (GRS) is soon to be published by
the EC and received a number of submissions
relating to n-1 security and the real time
operation of power system.
In a recent submission to the EC on the GRS
Transpower noted the following:
“it is critical that planning standards and
those for system operation are consistent…
Given the widely different timescales of grid
planning versus system operation, and the
typically regional focus of the former but
national focus of the latter, system opera-
tion standards should be an input to grid
planning but not vice versa.”
The system operator is required to invest to
maintain n – 1 security and to operate the
national grid with n -1 security in real time.
Meridian noted in its submission that:
“the operational aspects and the System
Operator Policy Statement should reflect
the GRS… Once decided, the System
Operator should be required to deliver to
the planning standard in an operational
sense and no higher… There is a significant
risk that if… customers select a
probabilistic reliability standard which is
less than N-1, that the System Operator will
continue to operate to N-1 in real time. This
may yield significant price constraints,
constrained on generation and additional
cost to the energy market that is not
 VoLL ($/kWh) 
Orion $13.72  + $6 /kW VOI 
CAE (Sep 2004) $17.17 
Electricity Commission $20.00 
VENCorp  
(Victoria, Australia) 
$29.60 Australian dollars 
Table 11: VOLL
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required or desired by the connected
customers.”
That is the operational policies should reflect
the security level defined in the GRS and not
the opposite.
Security of Supply and
Vulnerabilities
Transpower’s Annual Planning Report provides
a useful summary of the requirements and
issues being faced in delivering a secure
supply of electricity from the national grid and
specifically from Grid Exit Points (GXP) in the
North and South Islands. Only the South Island
transmission system and security incidents will
be covered here.
Grid Reliability and Security Issues
Transpower’s Annual Planning Report for 2006
incorporates the Grid Reliability Report as
required by the EGR’s and provides a useful
summary of issues that impact on n-1 supply
security in the South Island. The EGR require
that Transpower’s Grid Reliability Report details
 “whether the power system is reasonably
expected to meet the N-1 criterion and in
particular whether the power system would
be in a secure state at each grid exit point,
at all times over the next ten years, having
regard to the possible future scenarios set
out in the statement of opportunities.”
The issues impacting n-1 as Transpower defines
that term are listed in the table below together
with the planned projects aimed at resolving
those issues.
Addressing Security Vulnerabilities in
Canterbury
The process for addressing vulnerabilities in
the Canterbury region was summarised by
Transpower at the first CRESG Workshop on 7
September 2006 as follows:
• Transpower has indicated that supplies to
the upper South Island region could
become constrained by 2012.
• Through the RFI released last November,
Transpower requested information from
interested parties on alternatives for
meeting supply security past 2012.
• Transpower has communicated its request
through
– Industry forums held at Christchurch,
Nelson, West Coast
– Presentations to the city councils,
regional councils, chambers of com-
merce and other leading public organi-
sations
– Public advertising on release of the
document and encouragement of
submissions
Table 13: A.3.1 Backbone Issues and Resolving Projects (South Island)
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• Written submissions were received between
November 05 and late February 06.
The voltage stability constraint is more limiting
(on the amount of power transmission) than
line thermal ratings. It is very important to
confirm the load composition and performance
under low voltage using dynamic analysis. This
will determine if a voltage stability constraint
could occur.
The following responses were received through
the RFI process:
Supply Side Options:
• Only two specific supply side proposals
were received and both proposals concen-
trated on installing diesel generators up to
40 MW.
• Other possible options for local generation
included
– Small hydro
– Landfill Gas
– Wind farms
– Co-generation
– Coal fired thermal
Demand Side Options:
• Two specific demand side proposals were
received
– Some short term relief through demand
shifting between GXPs
– Demand reduction through demand
management up to 73 MW
• Other possible options included:
– Energy efficiency initiatives
Transmission Options:
• Tapping off electricity from the HVDC line
near Waipara (however, this option has
some technical and cost issues and
Transpower is currently considering advice
obtained from a New Zealand HVDC expert)
• Transpower has also been analysing the
possible incremental options for grid
upgrades that would allow deferment of
major transmission investment such as:
– Bussing of the 220 kV transmission
lines supplying USI at Geraldine
(effectively reducing the impact of
outage of a line) and shunt reactive
compensation
– Series compensation of the transmis-
sion lines (effectively shortening the
length of the lines)
– Major transmission investment (ie. new
transmission line) between Waitaki and
Christchurch.
To summarise, the most feasible Options as
Transmission Alternatives were:
• Installation of diesel generators in the USI
up to 30 MW
• Demand management (including efficiency
increases) up to 73 MW.
These options are presently being investigated
by Transpower who recently released a press
statement saying that due to the submissions
received for alternatives to its proposed
transmission upgrade, the upgrade may be
able to be deferred for an even longer period
of time.
Transmission Planning and Regional Benefits
The EC principle objectives are:
• To ensure that electricity is produced and
delivered to all classes of consumers in an
efficient, fair, reliable and environmentally
sustainable manner
• To promote and facilitate the efficient use
of electricity.
In addition to meeting its principle objectives
the government expects the EC:
…to take into account and contribute as
appropriate to the Government’s wider
policy objectives.
Those policy objectives include climate change
policy, the RMA and the National Energy
Efficiency and Conservation Strategy
One way the EC fulfils their principle objectives
is by administering the Grid Investment test
(GIT). Transmission planning must pass the GIT
before the plan can be approved. It seems that
the GIT process as it currently stands fails to
include a number of factors in determining an
appropriate investment path going forward. A
submission to the EC on Transpower’s 400kV
investment proposal for Auckland by The
Energy Centre at the University of Auckland
highlights a number of areas that the GIT
Page 47Canterbury Regional Energy Strategy Project
appears to ignore in the investment test. The
issues ignored by the GIT highlighted by the
submission include:
• The GIT ignores the effect different trans-
mission decisions have on resulting
generation scenarios. Analysis of generation
scenarios resulting from transmission
decisions is missing from the GIT and could
have a direct effect on Climate Change
obligations or the National Energy Strategy.
An example being where a deferred
transmission investment results in installa-
tion of a thermal generator resulting in CO-
2 emissions. The GIT ignores the potential
impact of this new generation.
• Optimal generation investments (and costs)
benefit from a reduction in risks and
uncertainty; and hence from longer-term
certainty and security regarding transmis-
sion pathways. Transmission deferral does
not create certainty.
• The GIT as presently applied misses or
underestimates some important benefits,
especially concerning the competition
benefits of ‘excess transmission capacity’.
• Generation and transmission investments
are interdependent in that transmission
investments can affect types, sizes and
locations of generation investments and
vice versa. This is not currently recognised
in the GIT.
These issues surrounding the GIT are very
relevant for the Canterbury region.
Sustainability, interdependence of transmis-
sion and generation and the transmission
capacity influencing competitive market
behaviour are some of the important issues
in planning for investments to ensure
security in the system. The GIT also does
not appear to take into account certain
social and community issues surrounding
the NIMBY (not in my back yard) factor. An
example where these issues had an
overriding effect on project viability was
Project Aqua, which was cancelled when
well into its design phase. Issues such as
environmental impact of large transmission
towers and the value of land for servitudes
are difficult to cost for the GIT. The various
parties involved will have quite different
opinions of what these subjective but
significant quantities should be. Other
areas identified that need to also be
considered in the planning process are
discussed in the following sections.
Market/Risk Vulnerabilities
• Planning for n-1 security on the grid doesn’t
appear to allow enough flexibility to
mitigate nodal risk. This can result in
constraints and influence price spikes.
• The market is supposed to deliver invest-
ment signals through prices but either this
signal is not occurring or it is not occurring
in enough time to plan investment before
security becomes an issue. Price signalling
also has the effect of reducing demand
growth. While Orion does do this to some
extent more could be made of the ability to
influence demand by providing price
information to consumers.
• One issue yet to be resolved is how market
price signals for short term, but relatively
high cost supply constraints can be
commercially contracted to ensure long
term system performance. For example,
how will a local embedded generator
contracting for the supply of grid capacity
support also provide the required pricing
risk cover to all grid loads affected by any
future failure of this service?
• Canterbury could benefit from 50MW of
peaking plant in order to delay transmis-
sion investment. This investment itself is
not economic but incorporating the savings
by delaying transmission investment it is
economical. Transpower as grid owner
saves money by not investing but the
region doesn’t receive this saving to put
towards the cost of installing peaking
plant. As noted above, for the peaking
plant owner to provide an alternative to
transmission, there needs to be an eco-
nomic cost recovery from the grid owner or
market, and the market needs access to a
transmission price hedge for the constraint
being managed.
• The market system tends to favour small
incremental investments. In a perfect
market situation these incremental invest-
ments would be guaranteed to occur and a
perfectly balanced system would result. In
reality, uncontrollable delays such as the
RMA consent process can cause each
incremental investment to fall further
behind when it is needed. As each incre-
mental investment is delayed the ability of
the system to cope with the shrinking
reserve margin (offered capacity – demand)
is reduced. This is where the system starts
to be constrained. A suggestion to mitigate
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this issue is to use the advantages of
economies of scale and combine incre-
ments into a larger investment. There is a
risk that the current market investment
model doesn’t put enough emphasis on the
benefits of economies of scale and hence
the overall system is suboptimal.
• The risks associated with incremental
investment include:
– Capacity in the system is always
stretched as investments are small and
“just in time”.
– Price volatility and nodal risk is high
– Much more difficult to plan for large
investments due to uncertainties in the
future being too hard to quantify
satisfactorily.
– Economies of scale may be lost when
they could be used to overcome the
uncontrollable delays occurring in
incremental investment.
• The risks with large scale investment
include:
– ‘gold plating’ the network
– Inefficient use of capital
– Stranded assets when demand or
supply doesn’t eventuate
– Price volatility is low – this is not a risk
but the true cost of electricity may not
be transparent.
The risks between incremental and large scale
investment are a balancing act between
efficient use of capital and ensuring adequate
capacity and security to facilitate regional
growth.
Many of these risks do not have an immedi-
ately identifiable solution to address the
vulnerability.  Most solutions result in a trade
off between risk and investment and it de-
pends on the companies involved as to how
much risk they are prepared to accept.
Nodal Risk
Operational issues such as managing n-1
security on the transmission system into the
Canterbury region can result in Grid Emergency
Notices being issued. These notices have a
tendency to induce price spikes and hence
increase nodal risk. This risk most affects the
retailers and consumers rather than the
transmission owner and results in concerns
that planning for and operating to a n-1
security level doesn’t allow enough flexibility to
manage nodal risk successfully. Supply to
Christchurch needs to be improved by 2008 in
order to continue meeting the n-1 security
standard but anecdotal evidence suggests that
nodal risk will be very high before this time.
Nodal pricing risks are a combination of two
things: Nodal loss factor of core grid, know as
ACLF (AC Loss Factor); and nodal constraint
factor made up of system constraints and price
differentials.  The nodal loss factor can be
quite high when it is considered that the
geographic load centre is situated near to
Hamilton and the geographic generation centre
is at Benmore. Data supplied by Meridian
indicates that nodal pricing risks can range
from 13 – 20% of nodal $/MWh prices. Based
on an average wholesale price of $65/MWh,
pricing risks can account for between $7 – 14/
MWh. This is a high value risk when the normal
price net margins for retailers are in the order
of $3 – 5/MWh in present market. The $7 – 14/
MWh nodal risk, if unhedged may swamp the
normal net retail margin and be unprofitable
leading to retailers reconsidering their growth
options in regions with high nodal risk. It will
depend on the availability of constraint hedges
and/or the risk acceptance of the individual
retailer as to whether they continue to trade in
an area with high nodal risk. In either case, the
consumer is likely to pay a risk margin for the
constraint and in many areas this margin may
well be higher than the transmission or
network avoided upgrade costs.
Where the nodal risk is greater than the profit
margin at a node, the node becomes more
unprofitable and market participants tend to
shy away from supplying load at that node. It
will depend on the risk acceptance of the
individual retailer as to whether they continue
to trade in an area with high nodal risk.
Supply Chain Risk
The overall supply chain needs to work
cohesively so that no one part of the chain
puts undue risk on the electricity supply to the
region. The supply chain consists of genera-
tion, transmission, distribution and retail. With
each part of a supply chain ideally being
equally responsible for security, assessment of
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the current situation in Canterbury would be a
useful planning tool to show the various
strengths and weaknesses. This would allow
for appropriate investment in different areas.
Whilst South Canterbury is a major exporter of
electricity to the North Island, Canterbury has
very little generation, so the focus for security
of supply is on the transmission system. If no
generation is installed it may be appropriate to
ensure security of supply by investing in the
transmission system over and above what
would otherwise be deemed necessary, simply
to ensure system security and adequacy.
Alternatively, installing generation locally in an
appropriate location may mean that transmis-
sion security is no longer a risk, provided
nodal pricing risks for all local loads can be
covered through market or off market hedge
contracts. With either scenario the generation
section of the supply chain has increased
security showing that there is often more than
one potential solution.
Another view of security and risk in the supply
chain as put forward by Network Waitaki is that
there is no merit in delivering high security
levels in only one part of the supply chain if
that standard is well beyond any security of
supply delivered at the customer connection.
Over-investing in any one part of the supply
chain can result in wasted investment and
overall higher costs.
Transpower plans and operates at n -1 security
for transmission to avoid cascade system
failure, but network companies can and do
have different definitions of security for their
individual networks. For example, Orion invests
in their network to provide ‘interrupted n -1’
security to certain groups of customers. There
is very little scope currently for a customer to
contract their desired level of security at a GXP
and not end up paying for n – 1 security.
Transpower operates at the higher n-1 security
level as it has so many customers resulting in
the idea of ‘paying for the security you want’,
or “user pays”, being very hard to implement.
There may be a case for further exploring the
“weakest link” in relation to Regional security
of supply standards. A Regional cost-benefit
analysis might reference to the identified
weakest link in the overall delivery chain,
whereas the national cost-benefit analysis
could determine the Regions net contribution
(import vs. export) to the total national system.
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8  PLANNING FRAMEWORK
This section combines the vulnerabilities of the
Canterbury region with respect to security of
supply and looks at the solutions that have
been proposed.
The following graph from the CMA Report “Will
It Take More Blackouts Before We See The
Light?” provides an illustration of the projected
national supply shortages by 2010-2012.
Analysing the regional implications of these
findings will be undertaken in Stage 2.
Further evidence of the deteriorating supply
situation may be found below. It indicates that
current security margins are, and will continue,
below the conventionally accepted Minimum
Security Margin.
Grid
The following details have been found through
a number of channels including; Transpower
presentations, the EC’s SOO and Transpower’s
APR.
Figure 10: Projected National Supply Shortages by 2010-2012 [Source TBC]
Figure 11: Decreasing Security Margin [Source:TBC]
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Networks
The following issues are some of the upgrade
options put forward by network companies in
the Canterbury region. Anything lower than
66kV has not been detailed here and readers
are directed to the individual Asset Manage-
ment Plans
Incremental vs Large Scale
Investment
The market environment that the electricity
industry currently operates in creates a
situation that favours small incremental
investment. This is due to the nature of
investment signals such as nodal price and
Table 14: South Island Transmission Vulnerabilities and Proposed Solutions
Vulnerability Date Proposed Solutions 
Supply to Top of South Island 2006 Transpower has already committed to 
string the third 220 kV circuit Islington to 
Kikiwa. 
 
Supply to Christchurch and upper South 
Island 
 
2008 -Bus the 220 kV Twizel–Islington circuits at 
Ashburton 
- Add capacitors at Islington. 
- Add capacitors at Ashburton. 
-Construct a new transmission line from the 
Waitaki area to Islington. 
- Install a large SVC at Islington. 
- Install new generation in or north of 
Christchurch. 
- Demand-side response. 
- Modifications to existing assets. 
Supplies to Upper South Island region 
constrained  
 
 
 
2012 Supply Options: 
- Generation north of Christchurch, diesel 
generators up to 40 MW 
 
Demand Options: 
- Some short term relief by load shifting 
between GXP’s 
- Demand reduction through load 
management of up to 73MW 
- Energy efficiency initiaitives 
 
Transmission Options: 
- Tapping off electricity from the HVDC line 
near Waipara 
- Bussing of the 220 kV transmission lines 
supplying USI at Geraldine (effectively 
reducing the impact of outage of a line) and 
shunt reactive compensation 
- Series compensation of the transmission 
lines (effectively shortening the length of the 
lines) 
 
The potential solutions outlined are 
incremental options to delay significant 
transmission investment 
 
 -Major transmission investment (ie. new 
transmission line) between Waitaki and 
Christchurch 
 
 
Overloading of a 220/66 kV 
 
Prior to 
 
Interconnecting transformer replacement 
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regulations requiring least cost investment.
Anecdotally, investment signals are not present
in the market early enough to be able to justify
a large scale investment or where investment
signals exist, no investment is made. The
reasons behind the lack of investment where
price and regulatory signals do exist are varied
but include, for example:
• A lack of clear longer term market price-risk
signals for indigenous vs imported energy
resources
• Uncertainties in policy and regulation
environments for longer term investors
• A lack of a clear “cost of capital” signal
from new investors for regulatory frame-
works and decisions supporting incremental
solutions.
• Often low probability event, but high
impact nature of the market supply pricing
risks
• A lack of appropriate mechanisms in place
for allocating “causer pays” costs for many
interconnecting transformer at Bromley 
 
2011  
Overloading of a Kaiapoi supply 
Transformer 
2008 Supply transformer replacement 
Overloading of an Ashley supply 
transformer 
2009 Supply transformer replacement 
Waipara supply security 
 
 Supply transformer replacement 
 
Overloading of a 220/66 kV 
interconnecting transformer at 
Islington 
 Issue can be managed operationally; no 
investment required at this stage. 
Overloading of a Bromley supply 
transformer 
 
 Issue can be managed operationally; no 
investment required at this stage. 
Supply security at Black Point 2006 New grid exit point (GXP) at Black Point 
Overloading of a 110 kV Oamaru- 
Studholme- Waitaki circuit 
>2006 
 
Thermal upgrade of the Black Point Tee- 
Waitaki circuit 
 
Overloading of a Timaru supply 
transformer 
<2010 Add a 110/33 kV, 80 MVA transformer 
Exceeding existing limits of an Oamaru 
supply transformer 
2008 Upgrade protection settings for existing 
transformer 
 
Exceeding existing limits of 
a 220/110 kV interconnecting 
transformer at Timaru 
 Under Investigation 
Overloading of a Temuka supply 
transformer 
 In discussion with local lines company 
Overloading of a Studholme supply 
transformer 
 In discussion with local lines company 
Overloading of an Ashburton supply 
transformer 
 
 Issue can be managed operationally; no 
investment required at this stage. 
Transmission security at Albury and 
Tekapo A 
 Transpower will discuss issue with local lines 
company 
Supply security at Tekapo A 
 
 Issue can be managed operationally; no 
investment required at this stage. 
Supply security at Albury 
 
 Issue can be managed operationally; future 
Investment will be customer driven 
Supply security at Waitaki 
 
 Issue can be managed operationally; no 
investment required at this stage. 
Supply security at Studholme 
 
 Issue can be managed operationally; no 
investment required at this stage. 
 
Table 14: South Island Transmission Vulnerabilities and Proposed Solutions (cont’d)
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price signals, other than by consumer
prices – should this in fact be the appropri-
ate outcome?
• Unwillingness or inability of major energy
consumers to acquire longer term supply
contracts and thus support new invest-
ments
• Average wholesale market prices do not yet
support new many investment hurdle costs
• Possibility of “free rider” outcomes.
Incremental Investment
Options
The incremental investment process is the one
that is encouraged by the current market and
regulatory environment. The options for
security of supply and long term planning for
Canterbury include the preferred investment
plan of Transpower as outlined below.
2008
• Bus the 220 kV Twizel–Islington circuits at
Ashburton
• Add capacitors at Islington.
• Add capacitors at Ashburton.
• Install a large SVC at Islington.
• Install new generation in or north of
Christchurch.
• Demand-side response.
• Modifications to existing assets.
2012
Supply Options:
• Generation north of Christchurch, diesel
generators up to 40 MW.
Demand Options:
• Some short term relief by load shifting
between GXP’s
• Demand reduction through load manage-
ment of up to 73MW
• Energy efficiency initiaitives.
Transmission Options:
• Construct a new transmission line from the
Waitaki area to Islington.
• Tapping off electricity from the HVDC line
near Waipara
• Bussing of the 220 kV transmission lines
supplying USI at Geraldine (effectively
reducing the impact of outage of a line)
and shunt reactive compensation
• Series compensation of the transmission
lines (effectively shortening the length of
the lines).
In undertaking an incremental investment
approach much of the investment savings
come through deferred capital expenditure. It is
unknown how this value of deferred capital
expenditure compares with the nodal risk and
security risk caused by the investment’s
incremental nature.
Potential Large Scale
Investment Options
The large-scale investment options for Christch-
urch are varied and potentially involve a
number of investment combinations.  In terms
of comparison with the incremental invest-
ments above, the following investments could
be considered as part of a large-scale invest-
ment path:
• Major transmission investment (ie. new
transmission line) between Waitaki and
Christchurch in the near future (6 years?)
• Installation of major generation north of
Christchurch (relocating Whirinaki?, wind
generation? gas? coal? )
• Major demand reduction via demand side
initiatives (e.g. price signalling, load
transfer)
• Investment in peaking plant by networks to
reduce reliance on transmission and reduce
connection charges.
National vs. Regional
Planning
National planning and regional planning often
have a very different focus. The focus of
national planning is to ensure security of
supply for the whole country and to enable the
entire system to be operated in such a way as
to prevent cascade failure. Preventing cascade
failure is reliant on having a system that is
both adequate and has n-1 security, these two
combining together to give a reliable system.
Regional planning ensures security of supply
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Table 15: Consolidated Network Company Upgrade Plan
Location  
 
Issue Solution  
 
Date Network 
Company 
Bromley 220kV 220kV bus fault 
causes an 
interruption to 
150MW. 
Restoration 
achievable in 
2hrs 
Cost/benefit analysis of 
new bus coupler 
to be undertaken 
 
To be 
advised 
 
Orion 
 
 
Bromley 66kV  Single 
transformer 
failure causing 
cascade trip 
during high 
loads (10% 
of the time) 
Restoration 
achievable in 
1hr 
Short term- Automated 
load transfer 
scheme.  Long term-
Transpower to install new 
inter-connector capacity at 
Bromley 
 
2006 
To be 
advised 
 
Orion 
 
 
Islington 66kV 
Not able to 
supply load for 
a double 
transformer 
failure 
 
New interconnector 
capacity at Bromley 
Possible challenge of 
security standard. 
Treat transformer failures 
differently to line failures 
 
To be 
advised 
 
Orion 
 
Islington 33kV Not able to 
supply load for 
a dual 
transformer 
failure 
Reduce security gap by 
increasing 11kV 
ties.  
 
Convert Middleton to 66kV.  
 
Possible challenge of 
security standard. Treat 
transformer failures 
differently to line failures 
2006 Orion 
 
Papanui 66kV 66kV bus fault 
causes an 
interruption to 
100MW of load. 
Restoration 
achievable in 
1hr 
Cost/benefit analysis of 
new bus coupler to be 
undertaken 
 
To be 
advised 
Orion 
 
Brighton 
66kV 
 
Unable to 
supply 6MW of 
load 
during double 
cable or 
transformer 
contingencies 
Increase the quantity of 
11kV ties between 
Dallington and Brighton, 
 
2006 
 
Orion 
 
Lancaster 
66kV 
 
Loss of 14MW 
of load for a 
single 
Complete a 66kV loop from 
Armagh to Dallington 
Possible challenge of term 
2015-
2016 
 
Orion 
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cable failure 
Restoration 
achievable in 
10min 
“immediate” in C1 & C2 of 
security standard. 
 
Hororata 
66kV 
 
Loss of one of 
the Islington to 
Hororata lines 
during low 
Coleridge 
generation will 
require 
load shedding 
at Hororata 
Islington to Hororata line 
upgrade and capacitor 
installation at Hororata 
 
2006-
2007 
 
Orion 
 
Springston 
66kV 
 
Not able to fully 
restore load for 
a 
dual line fault 
 
-Security gap reduced by 
installation of 
Greendale substation 
 
 -Installation of Islington to 
Rolleston 
East 66kV line, see project 
192 
2006 
 
 
 
 
2012 
 
Orion 
 
Ashburton 
66kV 
66 kV GXP will 
exceed the firm 
capacity of the 
alternative 
supply 
(33kV??) 
Solutions to this have yet 
to be resolved but are likely 
to 
involve the addition of a 
second 220/66 kV 
transformer and a second 
feed from the 66kV GXP 
2008 Electricity 
Ashburton 
Ashburton 
66KV 
Additional 
security 
required 
-The two 60/100 MVA 
220/66 kV transformers 
working in parallel with a 
pairing of an existing 50 
MVA 
220/33 kV unit and the 
33/66 kV autotransformer, 
 -Two larger 220/66 kV 
transformers to replace the 
60/100 MVA units, 
- a third 60/100 MVA 
transformer, 
 - a geographically 
separate and new 
Transpower substation 
offering an alternative 66 
kV GXP 
<2015 Electricity 
Ashburton 
Elephant Hill Security of 
Supply 
A new GXP may be 
required in the southern 
region (Elephant Hill) due 
to irrigation demand and to 
reduce demand at the 
Studholme substation 
<2015 Alpine 
Energy 
 
Table 15: Consolidated Network Company Upgrade Plan (continued)
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for the current and future loads but should
also consider the desired rate of regional
growth not just the forecasted growth rate. If it
is desired that regional growth increase, the
infrastructure to supply energy to facilitate that
growth must also be planned and invested for.
National and regional planning have quite
different time frames associated with planning.
Nationally, planning is undertaken on a 10 to
15 year time frame.  From Transpower’s 2006
APR:
The APR …………. to provide a comprehen-
sive 10-year forecast of the issues impact-
ing on the National Grid and Transpower’s
plans and possible future paths for devel-
opment.
Comprehensive regional planning is undertaken
on a shorter time frame of between 3- 5 years
with tentative planning undertaken out to a 10
year time frame.  From the AMP of Orion 2006:
The AMP looks ahead for a period of 10 years
commencing 1 April 2005. The main focus of
analysis is the first three to five years and for
this period most specific projects have been
identified. Beyond this period, analysis tends
to be more indicative based on long term
trends and it is likely that new development
project requirements will arise in the latter half
of the 10 year planning period that are not
currently identified.
National vs. Regional
Benefits
Different investment plans result in different
distributions of the benefit of the investment.
For example, an incremental investment plan
benefits Transpower by deferring investment
and hence saving them money. This investment
plan may still leave Canterbury with high nodal
risk and potentially constrained capacity under
certain operating conditions. Canterbury has
received none of the benefits that Transpower
has through the delayed investment.
Conversely, if a stronger grid resulted out of
Transpower investing heavily in transmission
then Canterbury benefits hugely through
increased security, the ability to attract energy
intensive industries and lower nodal risk but
Transpower is paying the investment cost.
Some of this cost is passed onto the network
company through connection charges but the
immediate sunk capital cost is Transpower’s.
National vs. regional
benefit issues are
highlighted by the
suggestion that:
Canterbury region would benefit from 50MW of
gas engine peaking plant intended to operate
8hours per week day during peak season.
Installed in a location where heat can be
utilised (to raise water supply temp, for
example, reducing consumer load or providing
energy for heat pumps). This would cap energy
price by always bidding into market at operat-
ing cost and also stop generator gaming.
The issue with this suggestion is that currently
the investment by itself is not financially viable
but should the peaking plant be installed,
Transpower may be saved some necessary
investment. If this benefit to Transpower was
able to be transferred to the Canterbury region
then the peaking plant investment may
become viable.
Transferring of benefits does not fit easily
within the market environment and regulatory
change would be required to the way in which
the GIT is implemented before options like this
one could be investigated.
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9  FUTURE GENERATION OPPORTUNITIES
The National Statement of Opportunities (SOO),
produced by the Electricity Commission,
modelled a number of future generation
scenarios and their respective effects on the
generation and transmission balance within a
region.
These scenarios incorporated a large number of
simulations and analysis, including NPV
analysis of suggested projects based on
market simulation to obtain nodal prices, and
power system analysis to study stability,
constraints and interregional flows.
Projected Regional
Generation and Demand
Balance
The following graphs illustrate the supply and
demand projection for the Canterbury and
South Canterbury regions between 2005 and
2025 and set the context for the generation
scenarios to follow.
These diagrams highlight the fact that Canter-
bury has significantly more demand than
generation currently and under future genera-
Figure 12: Regional Demand & Supply Balance for the Canterbury Region [EC SOO 2005:140]
Figure 13: Regional Demand & Supply Balance for the South Canterbury Region [EC SOO 2005:140]
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Figure 14: Annual Regional Demand & Generation 2005 – comparison of dry year against
normal year [EC SOO 2005:142]
tion and demand scenarios. South Canterbury
is the opposite, with significantly more genera-
tion than demand now and in the future. Under
each generation scenario in 2025, the expected
amount of installed generation vs. demand
forecast is used.
Under each SOO scenario illustrated above, the
growth in regional demand exceeds the growth
in firm regional generation capacity, indicating
that the timing of future grid upgrade decisions
is likely to be a key determinant of supply risk.
These scenarios indicate only renewable (likely
non-firm) generation growth in South Canter-
bury – with significant potential export capacity
growth
The suggests that Canterbury (excluding South
Canterbury) is one of the few regions in the
precarious situation of having significantly
more demand that generation, only Wellington,
Hawkes Bay and the Bay of Plenty are similar.
This difference between generation and
demand is a large vulnerability for the system.
The following figures indicate that this unfortu-
nate situation is unlikely to change in the
medium to long term either.
This analysis highlights the following:
1. That the extent of reliable new generation
in or north of Christchurch is a critical
factor in determining the most appropriate
augmentation of the South Island transmis-
sion network. It is possible that some
combination of capacitors at Ashburton and
Islington and generation in or north of
Christchurch could be sufficient to defer the
construction of a major new line.
2. The analysis also indicated that a number
of main transmission network South Island
interconnecting transformers were likely to
be significantly overloaded following any
outage of parallel interconnecting trans-
formers. The analysis suggests that both
the Islington and Bromley 220/66 kV
interconnecting transformers would need to
be upgraded at some stage during the
planning period.
3. Under most scenarios noted above,
Canterbury region grid reserve margins are
unlikely to improve significantly over the
next ten years. This indicates current
operating and pricing risks will remain for
the foreseeable future.
South Island Generation
Opportunities
Committed Generation
Committed projects include investment in
transmission augmentation, generation, and
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Figure 15: Canterbury and South Canterbury Regional Demand and
Generation 2005 [EC SOO 2005:148]
demand-side management. The GIT defines
“committed projects” as those, which are
reasonably likely to proceed, and where the
following are satisfied:
• All necessary resource and construction
consents have been obtained;
• Construction has commenced or a firm date
set;
• Arrangements for securing the required
land are in place;
• Supply and construction contracts have
been executed; and
• Financing arrangements are in place.
The only committed generation project identi-
fied in the initial national SOO (2005) for the
South island was the 16MW “Manapouri
Improvements II” hydro project by Meridian
scheduled for 2005.
Possible Generation
In addition to the committed project identified
previously, a vast array of potential generation
projects were identified in the SOO, ranging
from 300 MW gas-fired stations to 3 MW wind
farms. Many of these are reportedly under
active investigation by potential investors,
while others are only indicative.
While the table above suggests that a signifi-
cant number of potential generation opportuni-
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ties, the Study Team has been unable to test
the viability or feasibility of these projects, to
time constraints. We believe that such informa-
tion is central to a regional SOO / regional
energy plan and intend to rectify this issue in
Stage 2 of the study.
Generation Scenarios
Table 17 illustrates the generation scenarios
used by the EC in their analysis. While a
regional SOO may require slightly different
scenarios to be modelled, matching the
Canterbury scenarios with the ones used
nationally would allow for a direct comparison.
Table 17 summarises the potential new
generation under the different scenarios. Once
again this is derived from the national SOO.
This table of information may be able to
suggest particular planning studies for each
scenario that the EC has not undertaken e.g.
Should scenario x occur, what demand side
initiatives would the region like to see imple-
mented and how does this affect the outcome
for the region?
NPV Analysis
The NPV Analysis is intended to provide an
illustration of the base costs of each of the
generation scenarios and assist in the develop-
ment of a relative cost-benefit assessment of
possible investments. Results are provided for
4 of the 5 scenarios modelled.
Implications for Canterbury
from the EC SOO
1. A key issue arising from the analysis of the
South Island transmission network is the
increasing power flows into the upper
South Island.
2. Waitaki to Christchurch transmission
The requirement for new transmission into
Christchurch depends upon the power flow
into Christchurch and the upper South
Island from the south, and the extent to
which it is feasible to support voltage in
the area with capacitor installations. This is
highlighted in Figure 25, which is a graph
of peak power flow into Christchurch from
the south for each scenario. In the analysis
it was assumed that a number of circuits
are bussed at Ashburton and that capaci-
tors are installed at Ashburton and Isling-
ton. Under these circumstances it appears
that the security criterion can be met, with
the existing transmission configuration,
provided that the peak flow into Christch-
urch does not exceed 1060 MW.
When the flow exceeds 1060 MW, further
transmission investments have been
modelled in order to avoid voltage collapse
following an outage of the Islington–Tekapo
B 220 kV circuit.
This maximum flow is exceeded by 2020 in
the Coal Thermal scenario and in 2025 in
the Low Demand scenario. In the other
scenarios the maximum flow of 1060MW is
not exceeded during the study period, and
in the case of the Renewables and Large
Figure 16: Electricity flows into Christchurch from the south under different generation scenarios
[EC SOO 2005:151]
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Hydro scenarios, the flow at the end of the
period is less than the flow at the begin-
ning of the period as a result of the
addition of new generation north of
Christchurch in those scenarios.
3. Canterbury Regional Growth
Under all future SOO forecasts, the Canter-
bury transmission area remains a significant
Plant Location Type MW GW 
Banks Peninsula Canterbury Wind 100 395 
Canterbury Wind 
Farm 
Canterbury Wind 50 150 
Clarence to Waiau Canterbury Hydro 70 300 
Coal in Chch Canterbury Coal 50 130 
Dobson West Coast Hydro 60 270 
Hawea 1 Otago-Southland Hydro 30 171 
Hawea 2 Otago-Southland Hydro 90 435 
Hurunui Lowry 
Peaks 
Canterbury Hydro 36 160 
Invercargill Wind Otago-Southland Wind 180 550 
Lower Grey River West Coast Hydro 210 920 
Lower Waiau Canterbury Hydro 50 220 
Lower Waitaki 1 South Canterbury Hydro 260 1500 
Lower Waitaki 2 South Canterbury Hydro 260 1500 
Manapouri 1 Otago-Southland Hydro 25 158 
Manapouri 2 Otago-Southland Hydro 16 105 
Mid Waiau 
Nelson-
Marlborough 
Hydro 60 270 
Nevis River Otago-Southland Hydro 45 197 
Pahau Canterbury Hydro 43 190 
Pukaki Canal Intake South Canterbury Hydro 44 120 
Rough River West Coast Hydro 11 49 
Seddon Wind Farm 
Nelson-
Marlborough 
Wind 80 250 
Southland Lignite 1 West Coast Coal 380 2650 
Southland Lignite 2 West Coast Coal 380 2650 
Stockton Coal West Coast Coal 150 985 
Taieri Hydro Otago-Southland Hydro 40 175 
Taieri Mouth Wind 
Farm 
Otago-Southland Wind 200 615 
Te Anau Gates Otago-Southland Hydro 65 350 
Upper Grey River West Coast Hydro 35 153 
Upper Waiau Canterbury Hydro 56 240 
Wairau 
Nelson-
Marlborough 
Hydro 70 415 
 
Table 16: Potential South Island Generation Plant Options [EC SOO]
Plant Location Type MW Co 
Lyttleton Cant Diesel 800kVA Orion 
Bromley (consented) Cant Diesel 10MW Orion 
Belfast (consented) Cant Diesel 10MW Orion 
Portable Generation SC  
3 x 635 
kVA 
Networks 
Waitaki 
Table 16a: Embedded Generation
importer and South Canterbury a major
exporter of electricity. Notable also is that
future forecast generation growth in both
areas is predominantly non-firm renewable
energy, indicating the existing grid supply
reliance is likely to remain and that timing
of future grid upgrade decisions will be
critical to future supply risks.
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Scenario Assumptions 
Gas Thermal Bulk of new generation will be gas fired due to timely & extensive 
exploration for gas 
Level of gas field development required for this scenario is consistent 
with an assumption of ‘significant’ field development 
New plant will be commissioned predominantly near load centres or 
major gas distribution areas  
Coal Thermal Constraints on the development of other generation increases the 
reliance on coal as a primary fuel for large scale development 
Fuel sources include SI lignite, expansion of NI coal reserves & West 
Coast (SI) generation 
Coal will be barged to Marsden Pt. 
NZ supply may be augmented by imports 
New coal technology not assumed but coal gasification technology 
may also be a future consideration 
Large Scale Hydro The development of a large hydro scheme in the Lower Waitaki  
The development of hydro power stations at Dobson & Wairau 
Potential developments in National Parks specifically excluded 
Competing interests for water able to be accommodated 
Renewables Generation predominantly from wind, hydro and geothermal 
Presupposes a Resource Management regime that is favourably 
disposed towards hydro 
Large scale new technology generation (biomass, tidal) not required 
till after 2025 scenario boundary 
Low Demand Recasting of Renewables scenario at lower demand levels 
 
Table 17: EC SOO Generation Scenarios and Underlying Assumptions
Generation Mix Scenario 
Coal Hydro Wind 
Total MW Total GWH 
200 317  517  
Gas Thermal 
1115 2614   2744 
910 41  951  
Coal Thermal 
6285 263   6548 
1485 460  1945  Large Scale 
Hydro 7415 1415   8830 
 983 510 1493  
Renewables 
 4742 1565  6307 
150 276 260 686  
Low Demand 
985 1330 800  3115 
 
Table 18: Generation Mix under varying scenarios
 Capital Cost ($m) Operating Costs ($m) 
Scenario Generation Transmission Variable Fixed 
Total ($m) 
Gas Thermal $2,457 $587 $11,106 $414 $14,564 
Coal Thermal $3,009 $884 $11,979 $569 $16,531 
LS Hydro $5,399 $686 $8,052 $771 $14,908 
Renewables $4,275 $693 $8,326 $612 $13,907 
Table 19: NPV Analysis Outcomes [SOO:108]
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10  CANTERBURY REGIONAL ENERGY PLANNING
The following 4 elements will be central to any
proposed long-term regional energy planning
project.
Common Language
Participants in the electricity market face
varying degrees of regulation, operate to
different strategic horizons and objectives,
have diverse risk appetites and measure their
performance (and are measured in turn) using
different yardsticks.
The purpose of the Common Language Lexicon
is to align all these different factors to a
standardised and consistent yardstick in order
to facilitate communication, and provide a
basis for collaboration, between market
participants on a regional level.
Table 20 outlines the criteria defining the
framework for this Lexicon.
A summary comparison of key Common
Language terms used by regional participants
may be found in Appendix 2.
Collaboration Protocol
The Collaboration Protocol will set out the
rules governing the relationship between the
parties. [To be completed in consultation with
CRESG Partners]
Regional Statement of Opportunities
The purpose of a Regional SOO will be to
identify and prioritise optimal infrastructure
investment opportunities that will contribute
towards the project’s ultimate goal of facilitat-
ing the security of energy supply in the
Canterbury Region.
The development of a Regional SOO is outside
the scope of this stage of the project but a
SPECIFICATION DELIVERY PERFORMANCE 
Supply Criteria Planning Criteria Systems Operation Criteria 
Establish Demand Location Factors & 
Constraints 
Pricing Regimes 
Investment Horizons Options Analysis Security of Supply 
Growth Projections Preferred Solutions   
Demand Profiles (load, 
annual quantities) 
Financial & Investment 
Criteria 
Risk Transfer 
Load Factors Completion Risk Load Shedding / Rationing 
Consumer Category RMA & Consents Distributed Generation 
Service Levels Regulatory Compliance Transmission Rights 
Reliability GIT Energy Contracts 
Security Criteria Connection - Power Purchase Agreements 
VOLL Environmental - Financial Instruments 
Adequacy Governance System Efficiency 
Power Quality Operating Rules Losses 
Sufficient Supply  Load Factor 
    Interregional Flows 
    Nodal Risk 
  Operational Coordination 
  Demand Management 
  Smart Metering 
  Load Shifting 
  Price Signals 
  Energy Efficiency 
  Substitution 
  Swaps 
 
Table 20: Common Language Framework Criteria
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summary of potential opportunities is provided
in the following table. These opportunities
were identified from a range of publicly
available reports, including Transpower’s APR,
the Electricity Commission Interim Statement of
Opportunities March 2005, and the Asset
Management Plans of the various distribution
companies operating in the Region.
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11  QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION
In the compilation of this report a number of
discussion points and unanswered questions
arose that directly affect the issues of regional
and national planning for security of supply.
These points are listed below.
Questions
• Should there be a regulated standard of
security across the electricity system?
There is currently no standard for security
across the system that is mandated by
regulation. The EEA guidelines are good
basis for security planning and the ODV
produced by Transpower bases it’s method-
ology on similar requirements. Should the
adequacy of regulation of security stand-
ards be investigated? Would the EEA
guidelines provide a suitable standard for
regulation? Why or why not?
• What is an appropriate measure for power
quality?
Currently measures such as SAIDI,
SAIFI,CAIDI and system minutes are used.
Suggestions of using VoLL instead or
perhaps in conjunction with the traditional
measures have been made. VoLL gives a
measure of the risk a customer is prepared
to accept and so the security of supply
they receive should reflect this risk accept-
ance. With differing values of VoLL used by
different entities (Orion = $13/kWh, CAE =
$17/kWh, EC = $20/kWh) does this mean
that Canterbury will accept more risk from
the grid than the national average?
• Should network companies have more
influence on system investment where it
directly affects their business?
Generation and retail sectors of the
electricity industry are national industries,
their business can be shifted to mitigate
undesirable circumstances such as high
nodal risk. Subtransmission is regionally
constrained so has no ability to mitigate
risks by shifting their business.
• Does the Grid Investment Test (GIT)
adequately consider regional and social or
community needs? If not, who should be
able to put influence and input into the GIT
and what mechanisms could be used to do
this?
• Should a network company want to pay for
security and hence grid investment that
Transpower doesn’t deem necessary under
it’s planning criteria, can payment be made
so that the desired security level is ob-
tained?
• Is it possible to contract for lower security
from the grid e.g. n security and have the
grid operated in real time to n security at
that node?
• The end of mandatory supply will occur in
2013. What will happen in the system after
this time? How will these customers
contract for supply?
This date of 2013 fits within the planning
time frame of Transpower and the long
term forecasts of network companies, yet
very little has been mentioned to date on
this. Will prices rise? How many customers
may be affected? Is everyone just hoping
that the law will change?
• Are there ways to change or augment the
current planning rationale to give different
types of investments that exhibit these
economies of scale a greater chance of
success?
Incremental investment results in econo-
mies of scale being lost. These economies
of scale may be cost of capital, size of
plant or management of assets. By having
an environment that encourages just in
time investment these economies are lost
resulting in an overall sub-optimal solution.
• How should the constraint pricing risks be
allocated and how will Retailers total
regional load risks be covered if local
incremental supply solutions are used to
manage grid constraints?
Discussion Points
• The commercial sector needs to be more
proactive in finding solutions to their
energy solutions. It may be that using VoLL
in these situations helps both the industry
and network companies come to agreed
solutions.
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• Incremental investment results in a ‘just in
time’ philosophy that results in delayed
investment until future uncertainties are
known. This delay itself causes further
uncertainty and so could be a self-perpetu-
ating cycle of investment delay. Large-scale
investments and the associated economies
of scale could be a solution to these
delays.
• International experience (including New
Zealand re. Auckland 1998 and 2006) has
shown that it often takes a major system
incident before investment occurs and
restores the system to an acceptable
operating level.
• It appears that some nodal risk is desired
in order to justify planned investments. The
issue is that if the risk is too high a market
participant could walk away from doing
business there but if the nodal risk doesn’t
exist then investment won’t pay for itself.
Related to this is that while nodal risk
indicates the opportunity for investment,
once investment is made the nodal risk
drops and economic payback for the
investment may not be viable. This again
increases uncertainty and delays.
• Regarding DSM, retail prices appear to be
too cheap to affect change to customer
demand profiles. Without the incentive of
large prices to influence knowledge
acquisition and understanding, end use
energy patterns (particularly residential) are
not going to change. Related to increased
effectiveness of the demand side of the
market.
• Using VoLL as a measure to facilitate
security planning has both pros and cons.
The pros being that risk acceptance of
customer blocks or regions can be known
and security planned accordingly but the
cons are that in a meshed urban network
differentiating between different customers
with different risk preferences is very
complicated. Where the majority wish for n-
1 security and the minority want n security
there exists the potential for the n security
customers to ‘free ride’ off the n-1 security
paid for by other customers.
• Investment planning is undertaken based
on demand peaks, which are growing. The
result of this is the reserve margin in the
system is getting smaller due to a delay in
generation investment. Whatever the
reasons for the delay in generation invest-
ment this shrinking of the reserve margin
affects the ability of the system to cope
with unforeseen events. These constraints
will then impact on the market producing
higher prices and greater uncertainty.
Market participants may even prefer this
scenario where they can earn a greater
return.
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12  KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED
Two key issues for Canterbury have been
highlighted in this report. They are summarised
below.
• The grid in the upper South Island region
only has n-1 security because of opera-
tional constraints
The core grid should have n-1 security
under all foreseeable normal operating
scenarios, now and in the future.
Issues/Solutions:
A potential solution to mitigate this
problem involves approximately 30-40MW
of embedded generation in Canterbury. This
would relieve the constraints on the
transmission system throughout the
Canterbury, Marlborough and Nelson
regions. This solution only works while the
amount of embedded generation in the
Canterbury region can increase at the same
rate as demand growth. If this increase is
not possible, the loads in the upper South
Island are exposed to constraints and
security issues. These constraints will
increase the nodal risk making the area
potentially unprofitable for retailers. While
the embedded generation in Canterbury
has solved the immediate transmission
constraints it has potentially exposed
another load area to increased security
constraints and nodal risk.
Transpower has outlined a series of
incremental transmission upgrades to the
transmission system as shown in Section 5.
These incremental upgrades satisfy their
planning criteria for maintaining n-1 security
though it may not be the best solution for
all market participants. The question has
been asked if the Transpower planning
criteria is too narrow and doesn’t acknowl-
edge the effects of the upgrades on a wider
enough regional/market area.
Associated with the n-1 security of the grid
is the load profile of the Canterbury region.
The load duration curve shows that large
amounts of peak shifting occur to flatten
out the usual peaks throughout the day
and year. The grid should not rely on this
peak shifting in order to provide n-1
security.
• The Canterbury region is very heavily
reliant on Transmission to supply electricity
to the region
Canterbury has very little generation of it’s
own to supply it’s load, and is therefore
very reliant on the transmission circuits
from the lower South Island to supply the
electricity needs of the region. This reliance
exposes the region to the risks associated
with those transmission circuits being
owned by another party, Transpower in this
case.
Issues/Solutions:
There are two main options to deal with
this issue. The first is to reduce reliance on
transmission by finding opportunities for
local generation investment and the second
is to retain the reliance on transmission
with an enhanced security of supply.
Local generation exposes the loads north
of Canterbury as detailed above due to
delayed transmission investment. This is
not necessarily an issue for the region itself
but it allows for the balance of power in
terms of investments to be held in the
Canterbury region.
Retaining reliance on transmission doesn’t
mitigate the transmission risk but doesn’t
provide a basis from which the region can
make submissions regarding transmission
investments and enter negotiations
surrounding adequacy and security of
supply, i.e. maybe greater security can be
negotiated due to the regional reliance on
transmission.
• The GIT doesn’t satisfactorily account for a
number of issues including interdepend-
ence of transmission and generation,
effects on sustainability, social issues,
market risks and supply chain risks
The GIT has recently been criticised
(Reference Auckland report) for ignoring a
number of key areas surrounding grid
planning. Transmission and generation are
mutually interdependent, the decisions
regarding investment in each one have
been decoupled. The inability of the GIT to
consider the interdependence of transmis-
sion and generation can result in invest-
ments being made that don’t fit with
climate change policy or the national
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energy strategy. Other issues that influence
investment decisions but are not accounted
for in the GIT include market risks such as
pricing signals and incremental investment
vs. large scale, nodal risks where con-
straints may force price spikes and supply
chain risks as well as social and community
issues.
Each of the outlined issues with the GIT
affect energy planning in the Canterbury
region. Without changes to the way in
which the GIT is implemented it is very
likely that a sub-optimal investment
process will be undertaken.
• What does ‘Adequacy’ mean for Canter-
bury?
A reliable system comes about from the
combination of security and adequacy. The
question of what is considered adequate
for Canterbury has been raised. A survey of
the main Transpower and network company
substations and GXP supply points has
highlighted the lack of true n-1 adequacy
and security of supply for the region. It is
proposed that a more detailed survey of
the supply points be undertaken in Stage 2
of the CRESP project. Further discussions
will be needed between the CRESG partners
to agree on the approach for this survey
and the criteria to be used.
The overall objective for the region is that
the core grid must satisfy true n-1 criteria
for adequacy and security while the
network companies can each agree on their
own criteria for their areas of supply. These
criteria could be based on either the
deterministic or probabilistic (with VoLL)
criteria or both and hopefully be imple-
mented with agreement of the stakeholders
in the region.
Page 71Canterbury Regional Energy Strategy Project
13  CONCLUSIONS
This report has highlighted two main issues for
Canterbury regarding security of electricity
supply. The first is that Canterbury is very
reliant on transmission to supply energy to the
region as there is very little generation in the
region itself. The second issue is that the
transmission into and out of the region does
not have n-1 security under all normal operat-
ing conditions.
These two identified issues show the need for
urgent investment and planning to be under-
taken to increase the security of supply to
Canterbury. Transpower has produced an
incremental upgrade proposal that defers the
need for major investment in the grid until
2012. This deferment, while still enabling
reasonable security creates constraints that
increase the nodal risk.
This report investigates the issues surrounding
regional and national planning and attempts to
put forward a method for creating a planning
framework. A suggestion that has come out of
this work is the need to a regional statement
of opportunities document similar to that
produced by the Electricity Commission but
focussing on a regional rather than national
level.  This will hopefully facilitate an agreed
plan of investment for the region that achieves
an optimal outcome.
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Appendix 1: Potential New Generation in SI by Scenario and Commissioning Dates 
      
     Commissioning Dates by Scenario 
Plant Location Type MW GW Gas  
Thermal 
Coal  
Thermal 
LS  
Hydro 
Renew 
-ables 
Low  
Demand 
Banks Peninsula Cant Wind 100 395   2024   
Canterbury Wind Farm  Cant Wind 50 150    2009  
Clarence to Waiau Cant Hydro 70 300   2017 2017  
Coal in Chch Cant Coal 50 130 2009     
Dobson WC Hydro 60 270 2017  2012   
Hawea 1 OS Hydro 30 171 2019     
Hawea 2  Hydro 90 435   2015   
Hurunui Lowry Peaks Cant Hydro 36 160 2015  2015 2015 2015 
Invercargill Wind OS Wind 180 550   2008 2013 2013 
Lower Grey River WC Hydro 210 920   2018 2013  
Lower Waiau Cant Hydro 50 220   2020 2020  
Lower Waitaki 1 SC Hydro 260 1500   2009 2022  
Lower Waitaki 2 SC Hydro 260 1500   2014   
Manapouri 1 OS Hydro 25 158 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
Manapouri 2 OS Hydro 16 105 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 
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Mid Waiau OS Hydro 60 270    2024  
Nevis River OS Hydro 45 197 2015   2021 2021 
Pahau Cant Hydro 43 190   2015   
Pukaki Canal Intake SC Hydro 44 120   2020 2020 2020 
Rough River WC Hydro 11 49   2024 2019  
Seddon Wind Farm NM Wind 80 250   2021 2021 2021 
Southland Lignite 1 WS Coal 380 2650  2012    
Southland Lignite 2 WS Coal 380 2650  2021    
Stockton Coal WC Coal 150 985 2011 2009   2009 
Taieri Hydro OS Hydro 40 175   2015  2020 
Taieri Mouth Wind 
Farm 
OS Wind 200 615   2024 2014  
Te Anau Gates OS Hydro 65 350   2014 2019  
Upper Grey River WS Hydro 35 153 2023  2023 2018  
Upper Waiau Cant Hydro 56 240    2023  
Wairau N/M Hydro 70 415 2024  2014  2014 
          
Total Potential New Generation by Scenario (MW) 517 951 1945 1493 686 
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Appendix 2: Common Language 
 
Central to the proposed common planning framework will be the 
standardisation and harmonisation of key concepts.  
 
Outlined below is a comparison of the key concepts and criteria used by 
different regional electricity stakeholders.  
 
The authors anticipate Stage 2 of this project will focus on determining and 
developing appropriate criteria for non-electricity industry stakeholders, e.g. 
territorial authorities, business groups (i.e. CECC), etc. 
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SUPPLY CRITERIA 
 EC EEA Meridian Transpower Orion 
Investment Horizon 20 Years (SOO)  20 Years 10 Years (APR) 10 years (with focus on the 
next 3-5) - AMP 
Growth Predictions Historical data on drivers for 
electricity demand.  
The drivers used are:  
 -population 
 -GDP 
- number of households 
- temperature 
- electricity price 
- correction for shortage 
years. 
 Based on demand forecast 
from the SOO? 
Based on demand forecast 
from the SOO and converts 
to regions using regional 
population data 
Historical Trends and known 
information about expected 
new load growth 
Demand Profiles (max, 
min, mid) 
Confidence Intervals 
90% confidence interval 
between the low and high 
forecast values 
 As for EC As for EC -With and without CAP 
-Cold Snap peak 
-30 Year history projection 
Load Factor     Ratio of peak to average 
demand 
Consumer Category New Category split at 
150MW 
Class of Supply based on 
Group Peak Demand (GPD) 
in MW. Classes: up to 0.5, 
1.5, 12, 60, 200, (300) and 
600 MW 
  Class of Consumers based 
on loads and types in SSS. 
Up to 1, 4, 15, 40, 60 and 
200 MW 
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Security Criteria  Security of Supply defined as 
"the inherent ability of a 
network to meet the 
customer demand for energy 
delivery without interruption" 
 
Reliability of Supply, (also 
called Adequacy) defined for 
the purpose of the Guidelines 
as "the actual performance of 
the network in terms of the 
amount of interruption 
actually experienced by the 
customer"  
 The main interconnected 
transmission system shall be 
designed to maintain N-1 
security criterion, meaning 
that the system is in a secure 
state with all transmission 
facilities in service and in a 
satisfactory state under 
credible contingent events. 
Specifically, for major load 
centres that are dependent 
on local generation for supply 
security Transpower plans to 
an n-g-1 reliability level. That 
is the system remains in a 
satisfactory state following a 
forced outage of: any 
transmission component and 
an outage of the single 
largest generator. 
n-1 and/or interrupted n-1 
and n-2 
VOLL $20/kWh or $20000/MWh $2 - 5/kWh (NZ pre 1999) 
A$5/kWh (Victoria 1999) 
A$20/kWh (Victoria recent) 
 $20/kWh or $20000/MWh $13.72/kWh  + $6 /kW VOI 
Adequacy  The actual performance of 
the network in terms of the 
amount of interruption 
actually experienced by the 
customer 
 The ability of the electric 
systems to supply aggregate 
electrical demand and energy 
requirements of their 
customers at all times, taking 
into account scheduled and 
reasonably expected 
unscheduled outages of 
system elements 
 
Power Quality      
Harmonics     IEC and Join Australia/NZ 
standards 
Voltage    10% violation on 220kV and 
100kV grid 
230 ± 6% 
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Frequency    49.8 - 50.2 Hz  
System Interruption    Interrupted supply in system 
minutes 
CAIDI  
SAIFI 
SAIDI 
Sufficient Supply *Ensuring electricity supply 
continues to meet NZ's 
growing needs 
 
*Ensuring electricity is 
transported to demand 
location 
 
*Eliminating waste 
throughout the electricity 
system 
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PLANNING CRITERIA 
  EC EEA Meridian Transpower Orion 
Location Factors and 
Constraints 
  *System Studies*Nodal Risk *System Studies*Simulation Load Growth drives system 
reinforcements 
Options Analysis Options are studied through 
the GIT 
Optimise network service 
levels against the cost of 
demand not served. The 
function cost of supply plus 
cost of demand not served 
during supply interruptions" 
should be minimised 
*LRMC 
* Environmental 
*Climate Change Policy 
*Scenario Analysis 
*Request for Information 
*Request for alternative 
proposals 
Cost analysis 
Preferred Solutions Through the GIT  Business Decision??? Business Decision??? Business Decision??? 
Financial and 
Investment Criteria 
*Efficiency and least cost 
*NPV 
 Profit Least cost Economic Efficiency 
Completion Risk   *Land Access 
*Resource Consents 
*GIT failure 
*Regulatory inertia 
*Resource Consents 
*Land Access 
*Monetary constraints 
* technical/contractor 
constraints 
*Resource Consent 
Regulatory Compliance   EGR *Transmission investment 
proposals must pass the GIT 
before they can be built 
*EGR 
EGR 
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GIT *Promoting economic 
efficiency (including energy 
efficiency) in 
transmission and the 
wholesale market; 
 
* As far as practicable 
reflecting the interests of end 
use customers in 
ensuring a reliable 
transmission system having 
regard to the cost to 
end use customers; 
 
* Reflect a reasonable 
economic assessment of the 
balance between 
different levels of reliability 
and the expected value of 
energy at risk; 
 
* Enabling selection of 
transmission upgrade 
options that maximise 
the total net benefits to those 
who produce, distribute and 
consume 
electricity after taking into 
account transmission 
alternatives; 
 
* Promoting certainty for 
investment in transmission, 
generation and 
transmission alternatives and 
investment contracts; and 
 
* Facilitating outcomes 
acceptable to Transpower 
and designated 
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transmission customers. 
Connection      
Environmental Ensuring the commission 
and the industry play their 
parts in creating a 
sustainable future in terms of 
Government environmental 
and climate change goals 
    
Governance      
Operating Rules      
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SYSTEM OPERATIONS CRITERIA 
 EC EEA Meridian Transpower Orion 
Pricing Regimes Efficient Pricing  *Generator =Wholesale Spot 
Price 
*Retailer = unit charges and 
line rental 
Postage Stamp Tariff Line Charges 
Security of Supply *Ensuring the electricity 
system operates effectively 
and efficiently in real-time, 
with a high level of reliability 
*Ensuring system ability to 
deal with changes in 
generation and use patterns, 
esp. intermittent generation 
The inherent ability of a 
network to meet the 
customer demand for energy 
delivery without interruption 
 The ability of the electric 
systems to withstand 
sudden disturbances such 
as electric short circuits or 
unanticipated loss of system 
elements. 
n-1 and/or interrupted n-1 
and n-2 
Risk Transfer      
Load 
Shedding/Rationing 
   AUFLS 
Automatic Under-Frequency 
Load Shedding 
*Peak Load shifting 
*Ripple Control 
Transmission Rights A financial risk management 
product that protects against 
price risks arising from 
transmission losses and 
constraints 
    
Energy Contracts      
Distributed/Embedded 
Generation 
Generation that is connected 
to a local network rather than 
to the national grid. 
    
System Efficiency      
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Losses     Losses occur through 
heating of lines, cables and 
transformers. Electrical 
losses are natural 
phenomena that cannot be 
avoided completely and 
result in retailers having to 
purchase more energy than 
is delivered to their 
customers 
Load Factor     Average load that passes 
through a network divided 
by the maximum load 
experienced in a given 
year. 
Interregional Flows      
Nodal Risk   Risk associated with 
transmission constraints on 
nodal prices 
  
Operational 
Coordination 
  With both national and 
regional operator. 
Coordination regarding HVDC 
transmission, submission of 
generation offer to the SO and 
submission of load bids to the 
SO 
*National: SPD market 
coordination and Security of 
supply 
Regional operating 
maintains security, 
manages outages etc 
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Demand Management To determine the optimal 
load management 
infrastructure for New 
Zealand in order to achieve 
the following benefits from 
the removal of barriers to 
investment in existing and 
new technology: 
 
    * Greater demand side 
involvement in the electricity 
market; 
    * Deferral of investment in 
distribution, transmission and 
generation; 
    * Cost reductions from 
improved market efficiency; 
and 
    * Innovation in retail 
products leading to 
consumer choice and 
increased competition.  
   *Peak Load shifting 
*Ripple Control 
Smart Metering   *Time of Use pricing 
*Real time pricing???? 
  
Load Shifting/ Swaps     *Peak Load shifting 
*Ripple Control 
Price Signalling   *Generator = Spot Price  Time of Use rates 
Energy Efficiency The Commission seeks to 
identify ways for electricity 
efficiency to contribute cost-
effectively to the 
government’s electricity 
objectives, and estimate the 
level of investment required 
to meet that potential. 
    
Substitution      
 
